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HIS Article reviews significant decisions of the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals and the Texas courts of appeals in the area of criminal
pretrial, trial and appellate procedure during the 1992 Survey period.
I. PRETRIAL
A. BAIL
In Martinez v. State,' the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reaffirmed
its position that later conviction of a felony offense renders a writ attacking
pretrial confinement moot. 2 After being indicted for murder, the defendant
filed an article 17.1513 writ seeking release from jail. Although the trial
judge ordered defendant released on a $10,000 personal bond, before the
defendant was released, he was charged with aggravated robbery, and bail
was set in that case at $30,000. Both the original murder and the aggravated
robbery charge arose from the same transaction. The defendant filed a sec-
ond application for writ of habeas corpus relief pursuant to article 17.151,
but the trial judge denied relief.4 The court of appeals affirmed that denial.5
The court of criminal appeals granted the defendant's petition for discretion-
ary review. During the pendency of the appeal, however, the defendant was
convicted of the underlying offense. Hence he was no longer subject to pre-
trial confinement, and the appeal was rendered moot.6
B. DISCOVERY
In Scott v. State7 the court found that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a defense request to have alleged contraband tested by
* B.B.A., Southern Methodist University; L.L.B., University of Texas; Attorney at
Law, Dallas, Texas.
** B.A., University of Texas; J.D., University of Texas; Associate Professor of Law,
South Texas College of Law.
1. 826 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
2. Id. at 620.
3. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.151 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
4. Martinez, 826 S.W.2d at 620.
5. Martinez v. State, 810 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991), ap-
peal dismissed, 826 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
6. Martinez, 826 S.W.2d at 620.
7. 825 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd).
1261
SMU LAW REVIEW
a defense chemist.8 While a defendant has a right under article 39.14 to
have any alleged contraband tested by his own chemist if he makes a timely
request for such an opportunity, 9 the motion in this case was filed moments
before a pretrial hearing scheduled by virtue of article 28.01. 10 Not only was
the motion not timely; I the defendant never attempted to show good cause
for the late filing.12
The edict of Brady v. Maryland13 continues to be ignored in some
quarters. In Earls v. State14 the defendant was convicted of assaulting a
deputy sheriff, a jailer, while she was an inmate at the county jail. On ap-
peal, the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in refusing to disclose
exculpatory evidence in the form of written statements of seven potential
witnesses. The defendant filed a timely pretrial motion requesting exculpa-
tory evidence in the state's possession. At the hearing, the prosecutor ten-
dered to the defendant a two page list containing the names, addresses and
phone numbers of fifty-two persons interviewed by the state, without
designating any of the persons possessing evidence favorable to the defend-
ant. The prosecutor gave the defendant exculpatory statements of seven per-
sons, both signed and unsigned, and gave another twenty statements to the
trial court for an in camera inspection, contending that none were exculpa-
tory. The trial court ruled that seven of these were not exculpatory. 15
Among other things, the statements showed that several days before the
confrontation, the defendant begged not to be on the fourth floor of the jail
for fear of being assaulted by officers as retribution for having assaulted a
jailer several months before; that an officer told inmates that male officers
were going to that floor and would not hesitate to do violence; that immedi-
ately after the fight between the defendant and the deputy jailer, officers told
the assembled inmates that they had just beaten one inmate and asked who
wanted to be next; and that one of the officers made reference to an inmate
thinking it funny when one of the deputies had previously been beaten up.
The court found that four of the written statements were exculpatory and
material.16 The court rejected the state's argument that even if the undis-
closed statements were exculpatory and material, the defendant should have
discovered them herself by interviewing the persons on the list provided,
notwithstanding the prosecutor's statements in open court.' 7 The court em-
phasized that Brady does not require the defendant to expose the state's
claims and the trial court's erroneous conclusion that the statements are not
exculpatory, and that the state's position would essentially "pervert the rule
in Brady, which requires that exculpatory evidence be disclosed, not
8. Id. at 525.
9. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 39.14 (Vernon 1979).
10. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.01 (Vernon 1989).
11. Scott, 825 S.W.2d at 525.
12. Id.
13. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
14. 818 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.).
15. Id. at 526.
16. Id. at 528.




In Thomas v. State19 the court revisited the Brady turf, once again con-
demning the untoward conduct of a Dallas county prosecutor.20 The prose-
cutor had used the eyewitness accounts of two witnesses to prove that the
defendant dragged the deceased behind an apartment building and shot him,
but failed to disclose another eyewitness who saw the defendant in the front
of the building at the time of the murder. This third witness's testimony
would have been both exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence. 21
The court reviewed at length the history of the state's duty to disclose
favorable evidence, and held that the three part test utilized to determine
when a prosecutor has violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment had been met.22 The court of criminal appeals struck a blow
for due process in a very sensitive area, reversing the murder conviction and
the life sentence imposed.23
C. CHARGING INSTRUMENTS
The Survey period included two examples of efforts by the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals of Texas to fine tune the parameters of the state's recent author-
ity to amend charging instruments. In Ward v. State24 the court of criminal
appeals held that an amendment to an indictment is an actual physical alter-
ation of the indictment. 25 The state filed a motion to amend the indictment
on the day of trial, relying on article 28.10.26 The purpose of the state's
motion was to allow the prosecution to change the name of the complainant
from "Seth Haller" to "Steve Scott." The defendant argued this change con-
stituted charging him with a new or additional offense under article
28.10(c).2 7 The trial judge overruled defense objections and granted the
state's motion. The written order of the trial court stated, "[t]he foregoing
Motion is hereby granted, and the indictment is hereby amended."'28 How-
ever, no interlineation to the complainant's name was made on the face of
the indictment. The court held that the indictment was never amended.
29
18. Id.
19. 841 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
20. Id. at 402.
21. Id. at 404.
22. Id. at 404. "Such a violation occurs when a prosecutor 1) fails to disclose evidence 2)
which is favorable to the accused 3) that creates a probability sufficient to undermine the
confidence in the outcome of the proceeding." Id. at 404. The court observed that the court of
appeals, in its unpublished opinion affirming the judgment of conviction, applied the wrong
standard of materiality in that it concluded the evidence did not create a reasonable doubt as to
the defendant's guilt. Id.
23. Id. at 407.
24. 829 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
25. Id. at 793.
26. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10 (Vernon 1989).
27. Article 28.10(c) provides: "An indictment or information may not be amended over
the defendant's objection as to form or substance if the amended indictment or information
charges the defendant with an additional or different offense or if the substantial rights of the
defendant are prejudiced." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(c) (Vernon 1989).
28. Ward, 829 S.W.2d at 788.
29. Id at 795.
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Instead the amendment to an indictment is the actual physical alteration of
the charging instrument.30 The court recognized that such an alteration
could be accomplished by many methods: for example, handwriting, typing,
interlining, or striking out.31 Regardless of the method used, it is critical
that notice of the amendment must come from the face of the charging in-
strument itself.32 This requirement is constitutionally based. Article I, sec-
tion 10 of the Texas Constitution guarantees an accused the right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him in a criminal
proceeding. 33 The court of criminal appeals has consistently held that such
information must come from the face of the indictment.
A portion of the trial level confusion in Ward stemmed from the relation-
ship between article 28.10 and article 28.11. 34 The role of article 28.11, ac-
cording to the court of criminal appeals, is to "[tell] us how charging
instruments are amended; that is 'with leave of the court and under its direc-
tion.'"35 Thus, when the state files a motion for leave to amend an indict-
ment, that motion is merely the vehicle which begins the amending
process. 36 If the trial court grants the request to amend, then the "leave of
court" provision has been satisfied. 37 However, "neither the motion itself
nor the trial judge's granting thereof is the amendment. '38
In a related decision, the court of criminal appeals in Rent v. State39 was
presented with an indictment that was physically amended approximately
six weeks after the trial court granted the state's motion to amend. At issue
in Rent was the date controlling determination of a defendant's right to con-
tinuance to prepare for trial following amendment of an indictment.40 The
court of criminal appeals held that the time of actual physical alteration of
the charging instrument is the controlling date.41
Not all proposed changes to indictments are article 28.10 amendments,
as shown by Kelley v. State.42 The court held that changing the defendant's
name is controlled by article 26.08. 43 That provision authorizes a trial court
30. Id. at 794.
31. Id. at 793 n.14.
32. Id. at 794.
33. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10.
34. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.11 (Vernon 1989) provides: "All amendments
of an indictment or information shall be made with the leave of the court and under its
discretion."




39. 838 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
40. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10(a) (Vernon 1989) provides:
After notice to the defendant, a matter of form or substance in an information
may be amended at any time before the date the trial on the merits commences.
On the request of the defendant, the court shall allow the defendant not less
than 10 days, or a shorter period if requested by the defendant, to respond to the
amended indictment or information.
41. Rent, 838 S.W.2d at 551.
42. 823 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
43. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.08 (Vernon 1989). That provision authorizes a
trial court to correct an indictment to reflect the defendant's true name. It provides:
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to correct an indictment to reflect the defendant's true name." Rather than
constituting an amendment to the indictment, the act of changing the de-
fendant's name is a ministerial act.4 5
The importance of Studer v. State46 continues to be reflected in decisions.
In DeDonato v. State47 the defendant was accused of operating a sexually
oriented business without a permit. On appeal, the defendant argued that
the county court lacked jurisdiction because the jurisdiction of the court did
not appear on the face of the charging instrument. The state replied that the
defense had waived the argument under article 1.14(b). 48 The court agreed,
reemphasizing that the defendant was obligated to raise any such objection
in the trial court while there was still an opportunity to correct any
problem. 49
In Whatley v. State5° the defendant plead guilty to aggravated robbery
and the trial court, finding the enhancement paragraph to be true, set pun-
ishment at sixty years imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that
he should be acquitted because he was only indicted for robbery. The state
conceded that the indictment only alleged the elements of robbery, omitting
that the defendant had caused serious bodily injury or that the knife was a
deadly weapon. The court observed that the caption of the indictment read
"felony charge: agg. robbery bodily injury"'51 and that the defendant and his
trial counsel had signed written admonishments from the court before plead-
ing, which notified the defendant that he was charged with "aggravated rob-
bery" and that the maximum punishment was ninety-nine years or life. In
addition the defendant testified at the punishment phase that he was not
surprised to be charged with aggravated robbery. The court held that article
1.14(b) 52 requires a defendant to object to such irregularities in an indict-
ment as absence of an element of the offense before the trial date to preserve
error. 53 In this case, as the defendant failed to object before trial and since
the record showed he knew he was being charged with aggravated robbery,
the defendant waived error.54
In Kobos v. State55 the defendant moved to quash the complaint charging
If the defendant, or his counsel for him, suggests that he bears some name differ-
ent from that stated in the indictment, the same shall be noted upon the minutes
of the court, the indictment corrected by inserting therein the name of the de-
fendant as suggested by himself or his counsel for him, the style of the case
change so as to give his true name, and the cause proceed as if the true name has
recited in the indictment.
Id.
44. Kelley, 823 S.W.2d at 302.
45. Id.
46. 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
47. 819 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
48. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon 1989).
49. DeDonato, 819 S.W.2d at 167.
50. 822 S.W.2d 792 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, pet. refd).
51. Id. at 793.
52. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b).
53. Whatley, 822 S.W.2d at 793.
54. Id. at 794.
55. 822 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
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maintaining a public nuisance on the basis that the underlying statute was
unconstitutionally vague. The motion was denied. On appeal, the state as-
serted that the trial court was without authority to declare whether the stat-
ute was unconstitutional because service had not been made on the Attorney
General of the State of Texas by virtue of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code, section 37.006(b). 56 The court held that service on the attorney gen-
eral was not required when a criminal defendant is questioning the constitu-
tionality of the statute.57
In State v. Hall"8 the court addressed a statute of limitations problem.
The defendant was originally indicted in the district court for criminally
negligent homicide of two persons. The defendant filed a pretrial motion to
dismiss arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction, and that the
county court maintained exclusive jurisdiction of misdemeanors with the ex-
ception of those involving official misconduct. Following the defendant's
conviction, the defendant appealed and the court of appeals reversed, hold-
ing that the indictments did not allege misdemeanors involving official mis-
conduct. 59 The prosecutor tenaciously filed an information in the county
court charging the defendant with the same offenses. The defendant filed a
motion to dismiss on the basis of the two year statute of limitations for mis-
demeanor prosecutions, under article 12.02. 60 The county court granted the
defense motion. On appeal the state argued that the statute of limitations
was tolled when the initial indictments were presented in the district court.
The state argued that the district court was a court of competent jurisdic-
tion because article 4.0561 granted district courts jurisdiction of all misde-
meanors involving official misconduct, and the original indictments alleged
this type of misconduct. The court held that for purposes of article 12.0562
a court of competent jurisdiction is a court with jurisdiction to try the case. 63
Under the reasoning of the court in Ex parte Ward,64 the district court was a
court of competent jurisdiction only if the indictments alleged misdemeanors
involving official misconduct. 65 Neither indictment did in this case. 66 The
court also rejected the state's argument that the district court was a court of
competent jurisdiction by way of article V, section 12(b). 67
In several cases the courts addressed the sufficiency of the indictments. In
Talamantez v. State68 each paragraph of the first count of the indictment
alleged the defendant misapplied a thing of value belonging to Wilson
56. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.006(b) (Vernon 1986).
57. Kobos, 822 S.W.2d at 780.
58. 829 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
59. Id. at 186.
60. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.02 (Vernon 1989).
61. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 4.05 (Vernon 1989).
62. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 12.05 (Vernon 1989).
63. Hall, 829 S.W.2d at 187.
64. 560 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
65. Hall, 829 S.W.2d at 187.
66. Id. at 188.
67. Id.; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 12(b).
68. 829 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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County, "to wit: use of county equipment, bulldozer and maintainer, of the
value of $750.00 or more but less than $20,000.00 by using the equipment to
clear brush, shape a creek, and tank dam, on property belonging to members
of [appellant's] family."' 69 Each paragraph alleged that the misapplication
occurred on or about and between the dates of October 31, 1986 and January
31, 1988, a fifteen month period of time. The only difference between the
two paragraphs was that the first alleged the defendant acted with intent too
obtain a benefit for himself while the second alleged an intent to harm an-
other. The defendant argued to the court of appeals that this count was
duplicitous as it alleged several transactions over the fifteen month period,
thereby joining a series of distinct offenses in each paragraph. The court
held that the indictment permissibly alleged misapplication of county equip-
ment over a period of time with intent to obtain a benefit for as long as the
county equipment was being used to complete the described undertaking,
and therefore, it was not duplicitous. 70
In State v. Moreno7' the defendant was charged by information with pros-
titution. The defendant filed a motion to quash, alleging that the term
"agree" should be defined in greater detail. The information actually alleged
that the defendant did knowingly agree to engage in sexual conduct, to wit:
deviant sexual intercourse with x for a fee, ten dollars payable to said x, said
deviant sexual intercourse being the contact of the defendant's mouth with
x's penis. The court held that the information tracked the language of arti-
cle 43.02(a)(1) 72 and defined the type of sexual conduct alleged. 73 Thus, the
facts requested in the motion to quash were evidentiary rather than being
required for the purpose of notice and plea in bar. 74 In addition, the court
emphasized that virtually all of the language in the criminal information was
descriptive of the alleged agreement. 75 It described what conduct was
agreed to, to whom it was agreed to, and that it was agreed to for a fee.
Thus, the defendant had ample notice.76
On the other hand, in State v. Horstman77 the court affirmed the judgment
of the trial court dismissing the indictment for engaging in organized crimi-
nal activity, on the grounds that the indictment failed to allege all the essen-
tial acts necessary to charge the offense and that the indictment did not state
facts sufficient to constitute an offense.78 The defendant filed a motion to
quash, arguing that the indictment did not include an allegation of some
overt act committed in furtherance of the combination and that it failed to
name the other members of the combination. The court agreed. 79 An in-
69. Id. at 176.
70. Id. at 184.
71. 822 S.W.2d 754 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.).
72. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1989).
73. Moreno, 822 S.W.2d at 755.
74. Id. at 756.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 757.
77. 829 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. granted).
78. Id. at 906.
79. Id. at 905.
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dictment simply does not charge the offense of engaging in organized crimi-
nal activity unless (1) it sets forth some overt act performed by the defendant
and (2) two or more other members of the combination are named. 80 These
are essential elements of the offense and were missing in this case, thus ren-
dering the indictment fundamentally defective.8'
In Hortsman the state tried an end run, by attempting to argue that the
indictment should not have been quashed because it at least alleged some
offense, that is, the offense of aggravated promotion of prostitution. The
court disagreed for two reasons. First, the indictment did not in fact suffi-
ciently charge the offense of aggravated promotion of prostitution.8 2 Sec-
ond, and equally as important, the court held that an appellate court is not
under a duty to see if a defective indictment is sufficient to charge some other
unintended offense.8 3
The court has encountered several challenges to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence based upon amended indictments. In Stevens v. State84 the defendant
was convicted of aggravated sexual assault. The defendant complained that
the court of appeals erred by holding that the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the defendant's conviction despite a variance between the victim's name
as alleged in the indictment and the name proven at trial. The court ob-
served that the court of appeals opinion issued prior to the court's decision
in Ward v. State,85 wherein the court held that in interpreting articles
28.1086 and 28.11,87 an amendment to an indictment is effectuated with the
permission and direction of the court, but the amendment itself is the actual
alteration of the charging instrument.8 8 Consequently the state's proof was
not sufficient to sustain the allegations in the indictment. 89 In Stevens the
court thought better of deciding the matter and remanded to the court of
appeals in light of Ward.90 Similarly, in McHenry v. State9' the defendant,
convicted of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance, contended on ap-
peal that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain the conviction because a
fatal variance existed between the allegations in the original indictment and
the state's evidence at trial. The court of appeals rejected the defendant's
argument holding that under the facts, the amendment to the original indict-
ment was effective. 92 In this case, prior to trial, the state moved to amend
the indictment, which was granted by the court which entered an order
amending the indictment. However the face of the indictment was never
physically altered to reflect the proposed amendment. During trial, the
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 906.
83. Id.
84. 844 S.W.2d 753 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
85. 829 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
86. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.10 (Vernon 1989).
87. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 28.11 (Vernon 1989).
88. Ward, 829 S.W.2d at 793.
89. Id. at 794.
90. Stevens, 844 S.W.2d at 754.
91. 829 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
92. Id. at 804.
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court submitted a charge to the jury which included an application para-
graph which set forth the allegations contained in the state's motion to
amend the indictment rather than the allegations in the indictment. Once
again, the court elected to summarily grant the petition for discretionary
review and remand the cause to the court of appeals in light of Ward.93
In Strickland v. State94 the court, relying upon Sopido v. State,95 held that
it was error to allow the state to amend the indictment on the day of trial to
change the cause number of one of the two prior felony convictions alleged
in the enhancement paragraph.96 The court reaffirmed that the error was
not subject to a harmless error analysis. 97
In Rasmussen v. State9 8 the defendant, conceding the state's right to
amend the indictment for theft, argued that when the state altered the lan-
guage from one case of cigarettes to three cases of cigarettes, the state did
not charge the defendant with the same offense. The court held that the
defendant was clearly charged with the same offense in both indictments. 99
The court stated the test to determine whether a defendant was charged with
a different offense: "had appellant been tried and found guilty on the origi-
nal indictment, would double jeopardy have barred trial on the amended
indictment?00' In this case, the court found that double jeopardy would
bar a subsequent trial. 0 1
D. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In Ex parte Preston102 the court rejected a "constructive abandonment"
approach to multi-count indictments. 10 3 In this single indictment, the de-
fendant was charged with three counts of aggravated robbery. After the jury
was impaneled and sworn, the state proceeded to trial on the second count of
the indictment only. The defendant was convicted of that offense. Subse-
quently, the defendant was reindicted for the same offenses alleged in the
first and third counts of the original indictment. The court held that this
subsequent prosecution violated the defendant's federal constitutional guar-
antee against double jeopardy. ° 4
The court recognized that the prosecution may, with consent of the trial
court, dismiss, waive, or abandon a portion of the indictment. 0 5 If jeopardy
has attached once such a dismissal, waiver, or abandonment occurs, the state
93. Id.
94. 827 S.W.2d 406 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.).
95. 815 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
96. Strickland, 827 S.W.2d at 408.
97. Id.
98. 822 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, pet. refd).
99. Id. at 712.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 833 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
103. Id. at 518.
104. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
105. Preston, 833 S.W.2d at 518.
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is barred from later litigating those allegations. 106 The state does have a
remedy if it wishes to preserve a portion of the charging instrument for a
subsequent trial. 10 7 Such a preservation can be accomplished by taking af-
firmative action on the record to dismiss, waive, or abandon a portion of the
charging instrument and obtaining permission from the trial court to do
SO. s0 8 The court will not recognize "constructive abandonment" but will
recognize express actions taken to avoid later jeopardy consequences and
preserve a portion of the charging instrument for a later trial.' 0 9
The intermediate Texas appellate courts addressed the issue of double
jeopardy during the Survey period primarily in the context of successive
prosecutions. An area that was particularly active centers on the relation-
ship, for jeopardy purposes, between driving while intoxicated prosecutions
and other offenses. In Jacobs v. State110 the court held that the defendant's
guilty plea to the driving while intoxicated charge did not bar a subsequent
prosecution for involuntary manslaughter."II The defendant in Jacobs was
arrested for and pleaded guilty to a charge of driving while intoxicated that
was enhanced by an allegation of serious bodily injury to a passenger in his
car. The passenger later died, and the defendant was indicted for involun-
tary manslaughter. In finding no jeopardy bar to the involuntary man-
slaughter prosecution, the court relied first on Blockburger v. United
States 12 in conducting its successive prosecution analysis. The court re-
viewed the statutory provisions of driving while intoxicated 1 3 and involun-
tary manslaughter 14 and the charging instruments for each offense,
concluding that each requires proof of a different element. 1 5 Significant for
the court's analysis was that driving while intoxicated requires proof that the
defendant was "intoxicated," while involuntary manslaughter requires proof
that the defendant acted "recklessly" and "cause[d] the death of an
individual.""16
The court followed application of the "elements of the offense" analysis
enunciated in Blockburger with a Grady v. Corbin 117 analysis. It reasoned
that the mere act of "driving so as to cause an accident" ' 18 was not conduct





110. 823 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.).
111. Id. at 752.
112. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The successive prosecution test from Blockburger centers upon:
"whether each [statutory] provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not." Id. at 304.
113. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-1 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
114. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1905(a)(1) (Vernon 1974).
115. Jacobs, 823 S.W.2d at 751.
116. Id.
117. 495 U.S. 508 (1990). The successive prosecution analysis required by Grady considers
whether "conduct constituting an offense for which the defendant has been convicted comprise
an essential element of the successively prosecuted offense?" Jacobs, 823 S.W.2d at 751.




here was whether the state relied on the fact of the defendant's intoxication
in order to establish his guilt of involuntary manslaughter.1 20 A review of
the involuntary manslaughter charging instrument reflected that it did not;
instead, the state alleged that the defendant recklessly caused the victim's
death while operating a motor vehicle by failing to maintain in a single lane
of traffic and driving an unsafe speed. Thus, because the two charging in-
struments relied upon different conduct for the offenses, there was no jeop-
ardy bar to the subsequent prosecution for involuntary manslaughter.1 21
Using similar analysis, the court of appeals in Casey v. State122 concluded
that a subsequent driving while intoxicated prosecution was not barred by a
previous municipal court conviction for driving on the wrong side of the
road.' 23 Once again, the critical inquiry centered on the facts upon which
the state had to rely to prove the essential elements of the second prosecu-
tion.' 24 Here it was not necessary for the state to prove the conduct of
driving on the wrong side of the road in order to establish the elements of
driving while intoxicated. 125 The appellate court went even further in its
analysis, reviewing the trial transcript for any references during his driving
while intoxicated prosecution to the fact that the defendant had been driving
on the wrong side of the road. That review reflected that the only mention
of this fact occurred during non-responsive answers from the arresting of-
ficer after he had previously testified that the defendant was speeding and
failed to stop at a stop sign, or in direct response to questions elicited by
defense counsel. Thus, not only was the fact that the defendant was driving
on the wrong side of the road not necessary for the state's proof, it was not
relied on in fact.126
The issue of driving while intoxicated following conviction for other traffic
offenses arising from the same event was also reached in Cooper v. State.1 27
There the defendant pled guilty in Justice of the Peace Court to the traffic
offenses of (1) failing to drive in a single marked lane, and (2) disregarding a
police officer. The state later sought to prosecute him for the driving while
intoxicated offense arising from the same transaction. The defendant filed a
pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus alleging a double jeopardy bar.
Then he appealed from the denial of that application. In finding no double
jeopardy bar, a panel of the court of appeals concluded, "Unless the traffic
offenses are lesser included offenses of DWI, or proof of their prohibited
conduct is necessary to prove the prohibited conduct in a DWI offense,
double jeopardy simply does not apply." 128 The court was cognizant that
there was a "potential problem" under the facts for the state to be able to
prove driving while intoxicated without use of the traffic offenses, but con-
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 828 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no pet.).
123. Id. at 219.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 221.
127. 828 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
128. Id. at 566.
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cluded "that is not our concern on appeal."' 129 The panel noted that the
state had assured the trial court that it could not and would not use that
conduct. It further observed that the defense had "several tools" to "keep
that conduct out of the DWI trial."' 130
A fourth court of appeals decision to address driving while intoxicated as
a subsequent prosecution for purposes of double jeopardy bar was the state's
appeal in State v. Remsing.13 1 Although the finding of no double jeopardy
bar was consistent with the holdings of the other courts of appeals, 132 this
opinion differs markedly in its view of the testimonial value of conduct un-
derlying the original conviction. 133 The defendant was charged with driving
while intoxicated and failure to drive in a single marked lane. 134 Prior to the
pretrial hearing on the driving while intoxicated charge, the defendant en-
tered a plea of no contest to the offense of failure to operate a vehicle within
a designated lane. The trial judge granted the defendant's pretrial plea of
double jeopardy to the driving while intoxicated charge. The state appealed.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the court of appeals relied heavily
on a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court, which noted that
"[p]recedents hold that a mere overlap in proof between two prosecutions
does not establish a double jeopardy violation."' 135 Thus, unlike Cooper,
which contained the state's assurance that it would not rely upon proof of
the conduct for which conviction had already been obtained, and unlike
Casey, in which the appellate court carefully combed the record for trial
references to such testimony, the appellate court was not concerned that tes-
timony relating to the other traffic offense would be adduced at trial. 136
Rather, the court reasoned that merely because the prosecution may offer
testimony concerning the failure to drive in a single lane in order to establish
probable cause, such testimony would not elevate that conduct to an "ele-
ment" of the offense of driving while intoxicated. 137 Thus there is a conflict
in the circuits, at least to the extent of what subsequent use can be made of
testimony concerning previously adjudicated traffic offenses occurring in the
same transaction as a driving while intoxicated prosecution.
Turning from the driving while intoxicated and other traffic offenses
arena, during the Survey period two courts of appeals addressed the issue of
"same transaction" for other offenses, with each court concluding there was
no double jeopardy violation. In Whitten v. State 38 the court rejected a
129. Id.
130. Id. The opinion did not specify those devices. Presumably they would include a mo-
tion in limine based on the prosecutor's pretrial assurances. The court did caution, however,
that the trial court should dismiss the driving while intoxicated charge, if at trial, "the state
cannot prove the DWI charge without bringing in testimony related to the prohibited conduct
for which appellant has already been punished." Id. at 566-67.
131. 829 S.W.2d 400 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, pet. ref'd).
132. Id. at 402.
133. Id.
134. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 60(a) (Vernon 1977).
135. Remsing, 828 S.W.2d at 403 (quoting United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992)).
136. Id. at 402.
137. Id. at 403.
138. 828 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd).
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defense argument that prosecutions could not be had for possession of co-
caine and possession of marijuana when both substances were found in the
same baggie. 13 9 The crux of the defendant's special plea in bar I1 ° to the
cocaine prosecution was that he had previously been found guilty of posses-
sion of marijuana and the state would be relying on the same evidence in the
second trial, namely, his act of throwing down the bag containing both sub-
stances. This argument was rejected as meritless "because the state was not
required to prove that appellant threw down a plastic baggie in either of the
two prosecutions."' 141
More problematic is the decision in Rice v. State,142 which involved a
prosecution for burglary with intent to commit theft after the defendant had
previously pled guilty and been convicted of the theft. In a split decision,
two justices of the panel concluded that there was no jeopardy bar because in
the burglary prosecution the state "did not prove the entirety of the con-
duct" for which the defendant was previously convicted in the theft prosecu-
tion. 143 Elements of the theft guilty plea conviction which were not adduced
before the jury in the burglary prosecution included: (1) the value of the
items taken, and (2) that they were taken without the effective consent of the
owner. 44 In contrast, the dissent relied upon Grady to conclude that the
state relied on proof of the same conduct [the theft of personal property] to
establish the essential element of intent to commit theft in the subsequent
burglary prosecution. 145
Double jeopardy concerns are clearly implicated in retrials following ac-
quittal. One variation of that concern occurs when the jury acquits a de-
fendant of an "aggravated" charge but is unable to reach a decision on lesser
included offenses. That was the fact pattern presented in Pullin v. State. 1
46
The defendant was indicted for aggravated sexual assault and tried before a
jury. The jury was given the option of convicting the defendant of either
aggravated sexual assault or the lesser offense of attempted aggravated sex-
ual assault. The jury found the defendant not guilty of the aggravated as-
sault, but was deadlocked on the issue of attempted assault.' 47 The state
then had the defendant reindicted on three counts: (1) aggravated sexual
assault, (2) attempted aggravated sexual assault, and (3) indecency with a
child. The defendant's jeopardy plea in bar was granted as to the aggravated
sexual assault count, but denied as to the remaining counts. The defendant
pled guilty to the indecency with a child count, and appealed, claiming a
139. Id. at 819.
140. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 27.05 (Vernon 1989).
141. Whitten, 828 S.W.2d at 819.
142. 831 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, pet. granted).
143. Id. at 600.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 603.
146. 827 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
147. In a procedural twist, the facts of this case reveal that the jury never returned a ver-
dict on the form provided by the court. By a jury note, the decision of "not guilty" to the
aggravated charge was relayed to the judge, as well as information that the jury was unable to
reach a verdict on the attempt charge. This position was clarified in an open court exchange
between the jury foreman and the trial judge. The jury was then discharged.
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double jeopardy violation. In rejecting that claim, a panel of the court of
appeals held that under the facts it was clear the first jury did not decide the
issue of guilt on the charge on attempted aggravated sexual assault.148 This
did not prohibit the state from reprosecuting that attempted offense or any
lesser included offense. ' 49 The panel then concluded that indecency with a
child is appropriately a lesser included offense of attempted aggravated sex-
ual assault. 1 50
Double jeopardy allegations are often raised in the context of punishment
assessed on retrial following reversal on appeal for grounds other than suffi-
ciency of evidence. The defendant in Wiltz v. State'5 ' did so successfully.
The defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated sexual assault and
sentenced to ten years probation. Thereafter he appealed, complaining that
the state had improperly exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of
race. On the basis of this Batson v. Kentucky' 52 challenge, the conviction
was reversed. 153 Appellant was retried, found guilty by a jury, and sen-
tenced by the trial court to five years incarceration. The court of appeals
reversed this second conviction and remanded the cause for resentencing.
The issue was whether a sentence of five years incarceration was more severe
than the prior probation, and if so, whether there was evidence that the de-
fendant's subsequent conduct justified such an increase. The state conceded
that there was an absence of evidence at the second punishment hearing that
would warrant the assessment of a more severe sentence. 15 4 However, it
claimed that the second sentence [incarceration] was not more severe than
the original probation. Rejecting that argument, and finding the second im-
posed sentence unconstitutional, the court of appeals noted: "It seems axio-
matic to us that the fear that probation could be lost, merely by successfully
appealing a conviction, would have a chilling effect on a defendant's decision
to appeal." '155
In a related area, the issue of use of punishment evidence and its potential
for double jeopardy violations was addressed by two courts of appeal during
the Survey period. Lester v. State 56 presented a case of first impression.
There an unadjudicated offense was used as evidence of misconduct at the
punishment phase of the trial of an unrelated offense occurring prior to the
unadjudicated offense. The question on appeal was whether such use would
bar any subsequent attempt to prosecute for the latter offense. The court of
148. Pullin, 827 S.W.2d at 2.
149. Id. at 3.
150. Id. Prior decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had established that it was
a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault despite the fact that indecency with a
child has the additional element of specific intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person, unlike assault. E.g., Cunningham v. State, 726 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
Therefore here, the court of appeals was only considering application of that holding to an
attempt.
151. 827 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. granted).
152. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
153. Wiltz v. State, 749 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no pet.).
154. Citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
155. Wiltz, 827 S.W.2d at 373.
156. 824 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
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appeals concluded it would not.157
The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault alleged to have oc-
curred on April 21, 1990. During the punishment phase of that trial, the
prosecution introduced testimony from a complaining witness in another
cause that the defendant had sexually assaulted her on July 4, 1990 [subse-
quent to the date of the offense for which punishment was being assessed].
The jury was charged at punishment that it could consider such evidence
only "with regards to the defendant's character and what should be the ap-
propriate punishment in this case."' 58 Following his conviction for the
April assault, the defendant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus
concerning the July assault. He contended that prosecution of the second
assault case would subject him to double jeopardy; that is, that he had al-
ready been punished because the second assault was considered when pun-
ishment was assessed by the jury in the first assault prosecution. The
defendant analogized his situation to state statutory provisions concerning
trial court punishment use of unadjudicated offenses. 159
The appellate court rejected any reliance on the statute since it applies
only to admitted offenses. 160 It found no jeopardy violation because the fact
that the defendant had his subsequent criminal activity considered by the
punishment fact finder "does not equate to a trial, conviction, or punishment
for that unadjudicated offense."' 161 Thus the defendant was only punished
for the crime for which he was on trial. 162 As a matter of policy, the court of
appeals could find "no good reason why a convicted criminal should not
have all of his criminal activity placed before a court or a jury in order that a
proper punishment can be assessed for the crime of which he stands con-
victed."' 163 Similarly it found no policy based reason to distinguish between
consideration of subsequent conduct and consideration of prior convictions
during punishment for a different offense. 64
The use of prior convictions to change [increase] the range of possible
punishment was considered in Shipley v. State. 65 The defendant was con-
victed of misdemeanor theft which had been "enhanced" by prior misde-
157. Id. at 778.
158. Id. at 777.
159. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.45 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1991), provides in pertinent
part:
(a) A person may, with the consent of the attorney for the state, admit during
the sentencing hearing his guilt of one or more unadjudicated offenses and re-
quest the court to take each into account in determining sentence for the offense
or offenses of which he stand adjudged guilty.
(c) If a court lawfully takes into account an admitted offense, prosecution is
barred for that offense.
160. Lester, 824 S.W.2d at 778.
161. Id. at 778.
162. Id. at 779.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 778. That use has survived double jeopardy challenges for almost ninety years.
E.g., Kinney v. State, 79 S.W. 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 1904).
165. 828 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, pet. refd).
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meanor theft convictions to a third degree felony. 166 Relying on Grady v.
Corbin,'67 the defendant argued that use of the prior convictions to enhance
the offense subjected him to double jeopardy because proof of the prior con-
victions is a necessary "element" of the enhanced felony theft charge, and he
had already been punished for that conduct. The court of appeals rejected
that challenge.' 68 Instead, it found that despite the fact that the prior con-
victions were a jurisdictional element of the felony charge, "proof of the
prior convictions is not that of a traditional element of the crime alleged."'' 69
Because proof of the prior convictions served only to redefine the offense as a
felony for purposes of conveying jurisdiction to a district court for conduct
which would otherwise be classified as misdemeanor, double jeopardy
prohibitions did not apply. 170 The panel reasoned that the Grady ban con-
cerning multiple use of the same facts applies only to proof of the corpus
delicti or criminal conduct giving rise to the prosecution.7'
Lastly, four courts of appeals decisions addressed the relationship, for
jeopardy purposes, between prior civil or administrative proceedings and a
subsequent criminal prosecution arising from the same conduct. Two cases
dealt with criminal prosecutions following prison administrative hearings
and sanctions. In Smith v. State172 the defendant was convicted of aggra-
vated assault on a correctional officer and sentenced to twenty years confine-
ment. Previously he had been subjected to a prison disciplinary hearing and
found in violation of the Disciplinary Code for the same conduct [striking an
officer]. As a result of that finding, limitations were placed on the defendant,
including fifteen days solitary confinement, twenty days commissary restric-
tion, and no advancement in classification. Finding no double jeopardy bar
to criminal prosecution following an administrative adjudication, the court
of appeals held that jeopardy protections apply to multiple judicial punish-
ment. 173 A different panel of the same court of appeals reached the same
result in Quevedo v. State, 174 concluding that double jeopardy protections do
not reach to encompass imposition of disciplinary punishment.175
A different type of administrative proceeding was involved in Walton v.
State,176 but the result was the same, despite the fact that the defendant in
Walton received a favorable administrative ruling. The defendant was
charged with misdemeanor driving while intoxicated. An administrative
hearing was held in municipal court to determine if the defendant's refusal
to submit a specimen of breath or blood would result in suspension of his
166. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(e)(4)(E) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Similar provisions
apply to other misdemeanor offenses such as driving while intoxicated.
167. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
168. Shipley, 828 S.W.2d at 478.
169. Id. at 477.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 827 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
173. Id. at 71.
174. 832 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref d).
175. Id. at 424.
176. 831 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
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driver's license. 177 According to the defendant's application for writ of
habeas corpus, the municipal judge made a finding of insufficient probable
cause when refusing to suspend the license. The defendant relied on that
finding to argue that the state was precluded from relitigating the issue of
probable cause in the prosecution for driving while intoxicated. Although
the defendant did not couch his double jeopardy challenge in collateral es-
toppel terms, that was the analysis used by the appellate court. Since the
"issues of ultimate fact" in a license suspension hearing differ from those in a
prosecution for the offense of driving while intoxicated, the court held that
the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not bar the state's subsequent prosecu-
tion.178 Also persuasive to the appellate court were the facts that the munic-
ipal judge in such a hearing is not acting in a judicial capacity and there is no
full hearing at which both the state and the accused are represented by
counsel. 179
A somewhat different spin on the issue of double jeopardy arose in Walker
v. State,180 involving a drug prosecution following a civil forfeiture. The
defendant was prosecuted for the felony offense of conspiracy to possess am-
phetamine. Prior to that trial, a civil forfeiture had been entered and the
state took possession of $75,000 which the defendant had shown to the un-
dercover officer from whom he was to have purchased the amphetamine.
Prior to trial on the conspiracy charge, the defense entered a special plea in
bar arguing that entry of the civil forfeiture constituted criminal punish-
ment. The court of appeals rejected that claim, finding that the forfeiture
was not so punitive as to negate the legislature's civil intent.' 81 That finding
was predicated on trial evidence that the defendant had stated he could
"move as much as twenty pounds a week."1 82 Thus seizure of the purchase
price of one pound, in light of an offer to purchase five pounds, was not
punitive under the evidence before the trial court. 83
E. MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
In White v. State8 4 the defendant was arrested as the result of an under-
cover sting operation and charged with delivery of cocaine. On November
17, four witnesses, including three officers involved in the arrest, testified for
about two hours. The trial judge declared a mistrial because of a hung jury
and set the case for a retrial on November 21. On November 20, the defend-
ant requested a transcription of the testimony of the state's three fact wit-
nesses from his first trial to prepare for cross-examination. When the
defense learned that the transcription would be unavailable in time, a motion
177. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 67011-5, § 2(f) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
178. Walton, 831 S.W.2d at 490.
179. Id. The court recognized, however, that merely because a hearing is "administrative,"
application of collateral estoppel is not precluded. Id. The issue of potential application was
further clouded in this case because no record was made of the municipal court proceeding.
180. Walker v. State, 828 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. rerd).
181. Id. at 491.
182. Id. at 490.
183. Id.
184. 823 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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for continuance was filed on November 20. It was overruled the next day
because of the short duration of the testimony of the first trial, the fact the
first trial had occurred only four days earlier, and the fact that all the per-
sons involved in the first trial, including the court reporter, were also partici-
pating in the second trial. The judge did allow defense counsel to review
with the court reporter any testimony from the first trial if a conflict with
prior testimony arose at the retrial. Prior to commencement of the second
trial, defense counsel testified that while the testimony was generally fresh in
his mind, he did not recall specific testimony which would hamper him in
the impeachment of certain witnesses. The jury assessed a twenty-five year
prison term in the retrial and the court of appeals affirmed, stating in part
that while the defendant was indigent and did have a constitutional entitle-
ment to a free transcription of the state's witnesses' testimony from the ear-
lier mistrial, the defendant was not harmed by the denial of the motion for
continuance. 8 5 The court observed that the defendant did not, at retrial,
request any readback from the prior trial. 186
The court of criminal appeals held that prior to retrial, the defendant was
entitled to a transcription of the testimony of the state's witnesses who testi-
fied at his first trial.' 8 7 The court recognized that as these critical state's
witnesses would establish the elements of the offense, it "must be presumed
that inhibiting appellant's ability to impeach such witnesses through their
specific prior testimony unconstitutionally impaired appellant's defense.' l8
In addition the court found that the availability of a court reporter for
"readbacks" of prior testimony was not a sufficient alternative to providing
the defendant with specific testimony necessary to conduct an efficient
impeachment. 189
The court found a distinct violation of due process in the overruling of a
motion for continuance in Petrick v. State. 190 The jury was picked on Thurs-
day and testimony began on Friday at 10:29 a.m.. The state had subpoenaed
six witnesses to testify. Presuming that it would take all day Friday for the
state to put on its case, defense counsel told out of state alibi witnesses to be
in court on the following Monday. At 2:30 p.m. on Friday, the state, after
examining the third witness, rested. The defense called one of the officers
who investigated the case and then at 2:45 p.m. on Friday, made an oral
motion for continuance until Monday morning, which constituted a delay of
two hours and fifteen minutes in reality. Defense counsel advised the court
that these witnesses were expected to testify to the defendant's alibi and that
there were no other witnesses who could do so. Affidavits of the alibi wit-
nesses were attached to the motion for new trial, which indicated that the
defendant was in Missouri on the date the crime was committed.
185. White v. State, 828 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990), rev'd, 823 S.W.2d 296
(Tex. Crim App. 1992).
186. Id.
187. White, 823 S.W.2d at 300.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 229 (1971)).
190. 832 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd).
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The court of appeals concluded that the testimony of the alibi witnesses
might have been quite favorable to the defense, particularly in light of the
victim's questionable identification of the defendant, and therefore held that
the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for
continuance.19 1 Clearly, this opinion promoted substance over form, and
recognized a serious due process violation. 192 While the court acknowl-
edged that Texas had not yet adopted the federal standard to determine
when a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a continuance to present
defense witnesses, the court found the federal standard instructive in this
case. 19 3 The federal standard included the following factors:
(1) the diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses; (2) the dili-
gence of the defense in procuring the witnesses' presence; (3) the
probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time; (4)
the specificity with which the defense is able to demonstrate their ex-
pected knowledge or testimony; (5) the degree to which such testimony
is expected to be favorable to the accused; and (6) the unique or cumu-
lative nature of their testimony.' 94
The court also noted that the defense attorney had interviewed the alibi wit-
nesses, obtained their affidavits and had made extensive travel arrangements.
Because the witnesses could not afford to miss work, counsel tried to accom-
modate them by having them come to Houston on the day they were likely
to testify.
F. PUNISHMENT ELECTION
In Saldana v. State' 95 the defendant was convicted in 1987 on pleas of
guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual assault, two counts of indecency
with a child, and incest. The trial court set punishment at fifteen years and
ten years in prison on the aggravated sexual assault counts, to be served
consecutively, and at five years each on the other counts, to run concur-
rently. On appeal, the court remanded the two aggravated sexual assault
convictions for reassessment of punishment because the charges against the
defendant were misjoined in two indictments. Upon remand, the trial court
denied defendant's motion to have a jury assess punishment, ruling that he
had waived his right to a jury at the time he entered his original pleas of
guilty. Punishment was again assessed at fifteen years on each count. The
court held that article 44.29(b) 196 "created a right to chose either jury or
court assessment of punishment after such a remand, notwithstanding the
choice at the original trial. 19 7 The language in article 44.29 (b), "[i]f the
defendant elects, the court shall empane[l] a jury for the sentencing stage of
191. Id. at 771.
192. Id.
193. The federal standard was set forth in United States v. Uptain, 531 F.2d 1281, 1287
(5th Cir. 1976).
194. Id.
195. 826 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
196. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.29(b) (Vernon 1989).
197. Saldana, 826 S.W.2d at 950.
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the trial in the same manner as the jury is empaneled by the court for other
trials before the court,"' 98 entitles a defendant who had not elected a jury
assessment of punishment prior to commencement of voir dire at its original
trial to receive jury assessment after reversal for error at the punishment
phase. 199
II. TRIAL
A. WAIVER OF JURY TRIAL
In the misdemeanor prosecution involved in State ex ret Tim Curry v.
Carr 200 the state refused to consent to the jury waiver, relying on the provi-
sions of article 1.13(a). 20 1 The respondent trial judge denied the state's re-
quest that the case be tried before a jury and set the case for a trial before the
court. The court held that effective September 1, 1991, article 1.13(a) was
amended to apply to "any offense other than a capital felony in which the
state notifies the court and the defendant that it will seek the death pen-
alty."' 20 2 Thus, the state's consent to a trial before the court is necessary in
both felonies and misdemeanors. 20 3
B. MOTION TO SHUFFLE JURY PANEL
In Jones v. State20 4 the court revisited the perennial complaint that the
defendant was denied his absolute right to a jury shuffle upon timely request.
In Jones after the jury panel was qualified, exempted and sworn and after the
parties examined the panel in numerical order, the defendant was afforded
the opportunity to shuffle the jury panel and declined. The state requested
that the panel be shuffled and the trial court obliged, pursuant to article
35.11.205 After the first shuffle was accomplished and prior to the state's
voir dire, the defendant requested orally and by written motion that the jury
panel be reshuffled, which was denied. The court of appeals held that the
defendant had an absolute right to shuffle, assuming a timely motion. The
court of criminal appeals held that article 35.11 does provide that a defend-
ant is guaranteed that the jury panel will be shuffled once, at either his re-
quest or the state's, but does not mandate that a defendant be allowed to
reshuffle the panel after the state has caused the panel to be shuffled.20 6 The
court held that there is no "absolute right" to shuffle the jury panel in cir-
cumstances existing in this case, where the defendant had the opportunity to
view the original panel, declined to exercise his right to shuffle, and the shuf-
198. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.29(b) (Vernon 1989).
199. Saldana, 826 S.W.2d at 950.
200. No. 71,514 (Tex. Crim. App., Oct. 14, 1992) (not designated for publication).
201. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.13(a) (Vernon 1989).
202. Curry, No. 71,514 (Tex. Crim. App., Oct. 14, 1992) (not designated for publication).
203. Id.
204. 833 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
205. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.11 (Vernon 1989).
206. Jones, 833 S.W.2d at 149. This rule assumes no misconduct in the state shuffle similar
to that in Stark v. State, 657 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
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fie at the state's request was done in the courtroom. 20 7
In Turner v. State2°8 the defendant was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to life. During jury selection, 117 potential jurors were called, but
as the courtroom was unable to accommodate that many people, the group
was broken down into about four panels. The court addressed the panel
members who were then given instructions to return for individual appoint-
ments when individual voir dire took place. After that time, the motion to
shuffle was presented. Article 35.11 creates a statutory privilege allowing
the parties in a criminal trial to have the names of the prospective jurors
shuffled.209 The parties must be allowed an opportunity to view the venire
seated in proper sequence and then have the option to have the names shuf-
fled.2 10 However, it was not the intent of the statute to have the names
shuffled based on information obtained during voir dire, gleaned from jury
information cards and/or biographical questionnaires. 21 The court recog-
nized that a refusal of a timely motion to shuffle was automatically reversible
error, but therein lay the problem in this case: the motion to shuffle was
presented after voir dire had commenced. 212 Voir dire commences when the
state begins its examination of prospective jurors, not when the judge begins
his/her initial instructions.213 The state won by default.
C. JURY SELECTION
In Woolridge v. State,214 the court struck down a trial court ruling which
limited defense counsel's ability to voir dire prospective jurors on their defi-
nitions of "reasonable doubt. ' 215 During jury selection at the defendant's
murder trial, the prosecutor stated to the panel, "[aind our law has never
had a state court case that says beyond a reasonable doubt means one thing
or another.... I can tell you what it doesn't mean.... In other words, if you
were convinced, you would be obligated to return a verdict of guilty of mur-
der."'216 During defense counsel's examination of the jury panel, counsel
twice attempted to ask a specific potential juror about the term "reasonable
doubt." The first time, defense counsel asked what "reasonable doubt"
meant to the juror in the context of the juror's prior civil jury service, the
prosecutor's objection to the question was sustained. Later, defense counsel
told the panel that federal judges do give a definition of reasonable doubt and
207. Jones, 833 S.W.2d at 149. The court observed that the term "reshuffled" has caused
some confusion in past cases. Id. at n.4. The court noted that there were at least two situa-
tions in which a defendant had the right to have the jury panel reshuffled: first, if the original
shuffle was caused by someone other than the state, such as the trial judge or other court
personnel; second, when the "reshuffle" really amounted to the defendant's first statutorily
authorized shuffle. Id.
208. 828 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd).
209. Id. at 176.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 176-77.
213. Id. at 177.
214. 827 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
215. Id. at 905-06.
216. Id. at 901-02.
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relayed that definition. Returning to the same juror, defense counsel asked,
"[is that close to what you believe beyond a reasonable doubt means?"2 17
Once again, the prosecutor's objection was sustained. The court concluded
the trial judge abused his discretion by restricting the defendant's voir dire
examination. 21 8 The question at issue was not repetitious, and it was not in
an improper form. 2 19 Although a trial judge may impose restrictions to cur-
tail the length of voir dire, the judge may not prohibit a proper question
when it is first asked. 220 In contrast, trial judges are authorized to prohibit
questions which substantially repeat other questions already posed by the
same party or questions which are asked after the prospective juror has
stated his position clearly and without reservation. 22'
Woolridge was tried before the court of criminal appeals determined that a
definition of "reasonable doubt" must be given in every jury trial. 22 2 Merely
because no definition will be given for a term in the court's charge "does not
render a prospective juror's understanding of that term irrelevant. ' 223 In-
stead, the court concluded that the juror's understanding of the term "be-
comes more crucial" to an intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges
"because there is no definition to guide what could be a juror's skewed per-
ception of the term."'224 Moreover, because disallowance of a proper ques-
tion denies the defendant the ability to intelligently exercise his peremptory
challenges, a harmless error analysis is inappropriate. 225 Since the harm lies
in denial of the ability to intelligently exercise peremptory strikes, requiring
a reviewing court to undergo a harm analysis226 is fruitless.227
In McCarter v. State228 the court reviewed the complaint that the trial
judge abused its discretion in limiting defense voir dire to thirty minutes.
The court at the outset noted competing constitutional rights, on the one
hand, the right to counsel which included the right to question prospective
jurors in order to intelligently and effectively exercise peremptory challenges
and challenges for cause during the jury selection process, and on the other
hand, the right of the trial judge to impose reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of voir dire examination. 229 Because the judge terminated the voir
dire while the defense attorney was asking general questions of the venire,
the two pronged test announced in De la Rosa v. State230 was used: (1)
whether the defendant attempted to prolong the voir dire; (2) whether the
217. Id. at 903. Once again, the prosecutor's objection was sustained.
218. Id. at 906.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 905-06.
221. Id. at 906.
222. Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The required jury instruction
in Geesa is prospective in application only. Id. at 165.
223. Woolridge, 827 S.W.2d at 906.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. TEX. R. ApP. P. 81(b)(2).
227. Woolridge, 827 S.W.2d at 906-07.
228. 837 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
229. Id. at 119.
230. 414 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967).
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questions the party was not permitted to ask were proper voir dire ques-
tions.23 1 Before the trial court terminated the voir dire, the defense attorney
had asked the venire general questions concerning the defendant's expected
testimony, law enforcement officers, anti-drug organizations, experiences
with African-Americans, the presumption of innocence, the concept of mere
presence, criminal records, victims of crime, and drug addiction. Numerous
responses were elicited. At the conclusion of the thirty minute time limit,
the defense attorney requested additional time to explore the following issues
with the venire: problems with drugs in the venire members' immediate
family, prior criminal jury experience, association/relationship with police
officers, and people accused of a crime by a police officer. The state did not
object during the defense voir dire. The state did contend on appeal that the
defendant sought to cover areas previously covered during the judge's or the
state's voir dire, a meritless position as the defense may not be precluded
from the traditional voir dire examination simply because the questions
asked are repetitious of those asked by the court and prosecutor. 232 The
court further found that the questions not permitted to be asked were proper
voir dire questions. 233 The court observed that had the trial judge deter-
mined that either party was prolonging the voir dire, the appropriate remedy
would have been to call the attorneys to the bench and instruct them to
expedite the process. 234 The judgment of conviction was reversed because
the error in the denial of a proper question, which prevents the intelligent
exercise of one's peremptory challenges, constitutes an abuse of discretion
and is not subject to a harm analysis under Rule 81(b)(2). 235
The defendant's complaint based upon time constraints found less favor in
Tobar v. State.236 The trial judge terminated the voir dire after forty five
minutes as the defendant attempted to question venire members individually.
The court of appeals therefore reviewed the complaint in view of the De la
Rosa standard and a third factor: whether the record showed that the jury
included veniremen whom the defendant was not permitted to examine.2 37
The court found that the defendant was not denied the opportunity to effec-
tively examine the panel or unfairly prohibited from conducting his in-
quiry.238 Defense counsel had the responsibility to appropriately budget his
time within the reasonable limits set by the court.239 Clearly, the court did
not appreciate how defense counsel spent his time, or the fact that he re-
served individual questioning for the very end of voir dire.24°
231. McCarter, 837 S.W.2d at 121.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 122.
234. Id.
235. Id.; TEX. R. APp. P. 81(b)(2).
236. 833 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992), vacated, No. 1081-92 (Tex. Crim.,
March 31, 1993).
237. Id. at 298.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 298-99.
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In Orosco v. State24 1 the state asked the panel generally whether there was
anyone who felt that only one witness testifying was just not enough to con-
vince them beyond a reasonable doubt; and then in an individual voir dire
examination, the state asked whether if only one witness was called by the
state and that witness testified believably to all the elements of the offense,
could the venire person return a guilty verdict. The defense objected that
the illustration was an impermissible attempt to bond the venire persons to a
certain set of facts. The court held that the prosecutor's questions inquired
whether the prospective jurors could, rather than would, convict on the tes-
timony of one eye witness, which is a proper subject of inquiry. 242
In Maddux v. State243 the defendant questioned the venire at length about
their general willingness to consider probation in a murder prosecution.
Counsel asked venire persons if, in the event of a conviction of murder, they
could consider as little as five years probation and no fine in the proper case,
and to those who replied in the affirmative, whether they were thinking only
of a mercy killing situation. The defense counsel then asked whether "in a
hypothetical case where there was a murder conviction and a child had died,
how many of you would still be able to consider probation?"'244 The state's
objection was sustained. The court held that while defense counsel could
legitimately question the venire persons about their willingness to consider
probation in a murder case, the defendant was not entitled to ask a hypothet-
ical question that was based on the facts peculiar to the case on trial. 245 To
show an abuse of discretion, a defendant must demonstrate that the question
he sought to ask was proper, which is defined as a question that seeks to
discover a juror's view on an issue applicable to the case. 246 The court dis-
tinguished prior cases which resulted in reversals when the trial court forbad
certain questioning on the ground that "defense counsel had been precluded
from determining jury bias in favor of categories of persons who would be
witnesses: e.g., nun versus lay person .*...247 police officer versus ordinary
citizen .*...248 white woman versus black man."' 249 The court emphasized
that if the present case had involved an aggravated sexual assault on a child
or some other offense in which the child complainant was a prospective wit-
ness, defense counsel would have been entitled to question the venire mem-
bers concerning bias for or against the child witness.250 However, as counsel
had been liberally permitted to question the venire regarding their willing-
ness to consider probation in a proper case, and as the additional inquiry
241. 827 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. refd), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 425
(1992).
242. Id. at 578.
243. 825 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. granted).
244. Id. at 513.
245. Id. at 515.
246. Id. at 514.
247. Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
248. Hernandez v. State, 508 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
249. Maddux, 825 S.W.2d at 515 (citing Abron v. State, 523 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. Crim. App.
1975).
250. Id. at 515.
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sought to commit venire members to consideration of probation in this spe-
cific case that would be tried before them, involving a murder, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in preventing defense counsel from asking the
question. 25 1
In T.K 's Video, Inc. v. State2 52 the court found no abuse of discretion
when the court disallowed defense questions of the venire as to how they felt
about seeing sexually explicit movies, those that explicitly portrayed people
engaging in sexual relations. 2 53 However the trial court, after sustaining the
state's objection as to the question asked, opined that the question could be
asked more directly. The defense' was afforded the opportunity to question
the venire as to their feelings about there being adult movie stores, whether
they had an open mind about being able to see one of these types of video
tapes, and how they felt about others they knew who might have seen an x-
rated movie. The court observed that a question asked of individual venire
members may be so broad that, rather than seeking particular information
from a particular panel member, it presents a general topic for discussion
and constitutes a global fishing expedition. 254 However the defendant's
rights were not abridged in view of the more specific questions permitted of
the venire members. 255
The defendant in Spelling v. State25 6 complained of a juror's failure to
disclose information during voir dire. This case was a retrial on punishment
only and involved a murder prosecution for the death of the decedent's three
month old son. Evidence at the hearing on the motion for new trial showed
that one of the jurors, while a member of the venire, had stated to another
member that she hoped that the case would not be one dealing with child
abuse because she had two grandchildren who had been abused, that it had
caused her some trouble later and that she would have to give life because
she felt strongly about it. She said nothing during the voir dire examination
about what had happened to her grandchildren or its effect on her. Her
juror information sheet stated that neither she nor any member of her family
had ever been a victim of a crime. She answered in the negative to the ques-
tion, "Is there anything we should know that might bear on your ability to
be a fair and impartial juror?" 257 During the voir dire examination, no one
asked her or any of the other venire members whether they or anyone in
their family had been the victim of violence or abuse and whether it would
affect their ability to serve as a fair an impartial juror.
The court recognized that "[w]hen a partial, biased, or prejudiced juror is
selected without fault or lack of diligence on the part of defense counsel, who
has acted in good faith upon the answers given to him during voir dire not
251. Id.
252. 832 S.W.2d 174 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd).
253. Id. at 177.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. 825 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no pet.).
257. Id. at 536.
1993] 1285
SMU LAW REVIEW
knowing them to be inaccurate, good ground exists for a new trial. '258
However it is the obligation of the defense counsel "to ask questions calcu-
lated to bring out information which might be said to indicate a juror's in-
ability to be impartial and truthful. ' 259 The court recognized that the juror
information sheet contained inaccurate information, but emphasized that de-
fense counsel was not diligent because he did not ask either the panel as a
whole or the juror individually "the more specific question of whether they
could not serve as a fair and impartial juror due to violence or abuse on them
or someone in their family. '' 260 This specific question would have likely pro-
duced an accurate answer from the juror.261 The court concluded that it
was not "reasonable for counsel to rely on the broad, general questions con-
tained in the juror questionnaire due to the likelihood, as demonstrated here,
of an inaccurate answer. 262
The defendant in Vaughn v. State263 prevailed when the court held that
jury bias was established as a matter of law thanks to the lack of any in-
depth questioning of the challenged juror.264 After the trial court swore and
impaneled the jury, the juror in question advised the bailiff that she thought
she knew the defendant from high school. The bailiff conveyed the informa-
tion to the trial court who then questioned the juror outside the presence of
the other jurors. After the juror said that she was sure she knew the defend-
ant from high school, the court asked if she could be fair and impartial in
view of that knowledge. She stated "no." The trial court asked her if she
knew the defendant personally, if she knew of his reputation in the commu-
nity, and if she socialized with him in high school. The juror responded
"no" to all three questions. The court told the juror she was still on the jury
and overruled the defendant's motion to quash the panel, treated on appeal
as a motion for mistrial. Under these facts, bias was established as a matter
of law, particularly because the record did not show that juror was asked or
that she ever stated or indicated in any way that she could set aside her
feelings concerning the defendant.265 Without such a showing, the trial
court had no discretion to determine whether her bias actually existed and
had to remove her from the jury.266
In the alternative, the court considered whether the trial court still re-
tained discretion to overrule the defendant's challenge for cause without an
indication by the juror that she could set aside her feelings. 267 In actuality,
the trial court never asked the juror the basis of her opinion. The court
assumed that unless her bias was based upon one of three questions asked of
her, her bias could not exist to such a degree as to warrant disqualification.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 537.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. 833 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd).
264. Id. at 184.





Ultimately the court held that as the trial court "failed to determine the
basis for Alexander's [the juror's] inability to be fair and impartial or
whether she could lay that opinion aside, it abused its discretion in not dis-
missing her."' 268 Proceeding with the harm analysis, the court noted that if a
defendant makes a challenge for cause prior to the jury's impanelment and if
the trial court erroneously overrules it, to establish error, the defendant must
show that he exhausted all of his peremptory challenges and that the defend-
ant was forced to accept an objectionable juror.269 If, after impanelment but
prior to the jury's verdict, the defendant discovers that a biased or
prejudiced juror was selected without fault or lack of diligence on the part of
defense counsel, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to grant a
motion for new trial.270 In this case the court asked whether any panel
member knew the defendant or any other participant, and no panel member
responded. Thus the question of impartiality was addressed. 271 The court
held that the defendant was deprived of his right to peremptorily challenge
this juror.272
D. BATSON CHALLENGES
Application of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Batson v.
Kentucky273 continued to be the source of much litigation at the appellate
level during the Survey period. In Hill v. State274 the court considered
when a Batson challenge is timely under the Texas system. In Texas, the
timeliness of a Batson challenge is controlled by article 35.261.275 The court
has previously held that article 35.261 was "intended to create uniform pro-
cedures and remedies to address claimed constitutional violations during
jury selection. ' 276 Thus, whenever a claim is made that members of a jury
panel were peremptorily challenged on the basis of race, the procedures of
that article must be followed. 277 That statute specifies that a Batson chal-
lenge can be made in a timely fashion "[a]fter the parties had delivered their
lists ... and before the court has impaneled the jury. ' 27 8 By its decision to
enact article 35.261, the Texas legislature elected to have only one remedy
for a Batson violation: calling a new array. 279 An examination of the legis-
lative history of the article reflects that the remedy was chosen to eliminate
any possible bias toward the prosecution which could exist if the remedy




271. Id. at 185-86.
272. Id. at 186.
273. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
274. 827 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 297 (1992).
275. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.261 (Vernon 1989).
276. State v. Oliver, 808 S.W.2d 492, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
277. Id.
278. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.261 (Vernon 1989).
279. Id.
280. Hill, 827 S.W.2d at 864.
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Hill the court concluded that because the only remedy is calling a new array,
it is not necessary for the jury panel to remain in the courtroom because,
regardless of the decision of the trial court to sustain or overrule the objec-
tion, only one remedy is statutorily available. 28' Thus, the court concluded
there is no logical reason to require that an objection to the prosecution's
strike be lodged before the venire is discharged. 28 2 As a matter of Texas law,
an objection is timely if it occurs after the jury panel has been dismissed, but
before the jury is sworn. 2 3
In a related claim, the court addressed the question of when a Batson
challenge is timely in a capital murder prosecution. In McGee v. State284 the
court concluded that a defendant may make his peremptory showing of the
discriminatory effect of the prosecutor's strikes at any time prior to the jury's
being sworn. 285 The procedures in capital jury selection differ from non-
capital cases. Owing to the unique structure of jury selection in capital
cases, the court recognized that it is difficult to establish the specific time
that jury lists are "delivered to the clerk" in the words of the statute. 28 6
Similarly, a jury itself is not "impaneled" until its members have been both
selected and sworn; 28 7 however, the scenario of typical capital murder voir
dire is the trial court practice of swearing in each individual juror as the
juror is accepted by prosecution and defense. Nonetheless, the court of
criminal appeals concluded that this trial court practice does not "change"
the determination of when the jury itself is sworn. 28 8
Reaching the merits of a Batson claim, the court in Linscomb v. State289
held that a prima facie case can be established by the high number of per-
emptory strikes used by the state against minorities. 290 This decision reaf-
firms the principle that the defendant's burden of establishing a prima facie
case should not be an onerous task. In a delivery of cocaine prosecution, the
jury panel included six African Americans. Although two of the six panel
members actually served as jurors, all of the remaining African American
members of the venire were excluded by state peremptory challenges.
When the defendant raised a Batson challenge, the prosecutor refused to
reveal her reasons for striking those members of the panel by claiming that
the defendant had not established a prima facie case of racial discrimination.
The court of criminal appeals held that such a prima facie case was made.291
Recognizing that "the bare fact of strikes exercised against persons of a cer-




284. 825 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
285. Id. at 710
286. Rousseau v. State, 824 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. 829 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).




mind," 292 the court further recognized that what might be "revealing" was
the "repetition of such strikes in suspiciously large numbers - numbers
larger than one would expect if race had nothing to do with it."'2 9 3
The court of criminal appeals also reaffirmed its commitment to the prop-
osition that in reaching the merits of a Batson challenge, it is not relevant
that some members of the race in question were not struck by the state.294
Similarly, it is not relevant that some members of that race actually served
on the defendant's jury.295 Neither fact is sufficient to address the underly-
ing concerns of Batson.296 The critical focus of a Batson inquiry is whether
the state exercised its peremptory challenges against even one venire member
because of race. 297 The court cautioned that what is sufficient to constitute a
prima facie case should not be confused with sufficiency of evidence to finally
dispose of the issue: "In determining, therefore, whether a prima facie case
is reflected on the record, courts are not to resolve the question of deliberate
racial discrimination on its merits by assessing the probative weight of com-
peting inferences or conflicting evidence. They are simply to decide whether
the issue has been raised. '298
Concerning the sufficiency of evidence to support a claim of racially moti-
vated peremptory challenges, the court in Young v. State 299 clarified that the
defendant is not required to present a comparative analysis of the prosecu-
tor's questioning of challenged and unchallenged prospective jurors. 3°° The
court characterized such a comparative analysis as merely an analytical
tool.30 1 As such it is a devise used by either party on appeal to show that the
ruling of the trial court was or was not supported by the voir dire record.302
Thus, it is not necessary for a defendant to request that the trial court make
a finding on the Batson challenge based on a comparison analysis in order to
have that evidence considered on direct appeal. 30 3
The court of criminal appeals repeated its position that Batson challenges
can be raised by a non-racial minority defendant. In Turner v. State3°4 the
intermediate appellate court decision had been issued prior to the court of
criminal appeals' opinion in Mead v. State,305 holding that under Powers v.
Ohio30 6 a white defendant could raise an equal protection claim as to the
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 167.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. "We start from the proposition that the United States Constitution is offended by
so much as a single strike exercised on the basis of race." Id. at 166.
298. Id.
299. 826 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
300. Id. at 146.
301. Id. at 145.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 146.
304. 827 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
305. 819 S.W.2d 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
306. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
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exclusion of minority veniremen.30 7 It was clear from the record in Turner
that the trial court did not consider the defendant's Batson challenge because
he was white and complaining of the exclusion of several minority venire-
men. 30° Because the court of appeals did not address that issue, the cause
was remanded.
During the Survey period the court of criminal appeals also revisited the
issue of establishing a sufficient prima facie case on a Batson challenge so as
to require the challenged party to come forward with race neutral explana-
tions. Rosseau v. State,3 9 a capital murder prosecution, reaffirms that the
court of criminal appeals will not review the issue of whether a defendant
has established a prima facie case of discrimination unless the trial court's
ruling on that issue stops the fact finding process. 310 In Rosseau the court
found the defendant's prima facie case sufficiently established when all
twelve capital murder jurors had been selected, the jury as a whole had not
been sworn, and the defense presented evidence to support the objection
which had been first raised and overruled immediately following the state's
strike. The defense evidence was that seven of the thirteen strikes used by
the state were against black and Hispanic panel members. The trial court
had restricted the fact finding process concerning one of those jurors because
of a mistaken belief that the defense was objecting for the first time on Bat-
son grounds only to another panel member's exclusion. These two facts
taken together [the pattern of state strikes and the restriction on the fact
finding process] were sufficient to establish a prima facie case. The appeal
was abated with instructions to conduct a full adversarial hearing.31'
Turning to the merits of explanations offered by the state for its exercise of
peremptory challenges, the court of criminal appeals approved some as race
neutral and rejected others. Wright v. State312 involved an insufficiently race
neutral explanation. All eight black veniremembers were challenged and re-
moved from the jury panel; the state exercised strikes against four of these
veniremen. The prosecutor offered reasons for her peremptory challenges to
three black panel members, but neglected to include a specific rationale for
the fourth struck panel member. She stated in general terms that she exer-
cised all her challenges based on what the jurors had told her and upon how
she believed they would consider the facts in the case. A review of the voir
dire proceedings revealed that during the state's questioning, the particular
panel member for whom the prosecutor did not give a specific explanation
had answered that a friend of his son had a drug problem, that he attempted
to find the friend help for that problem, and that he eventually had to fire
him because of it. However, because this colloquy occurred during the voir
dire examination and was not offered during the Batson hearing as a race
neutral explanation, it could not be considered after the fact as being such an
307. Turner v. State, 827 S.W.2d 333, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
308. Id.
309. 824 S.W.2d 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
310. Id. at 581.
311. Id. at 584.
312. 832 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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explanation. 31 3 Thus, in the absence of a race neutral explanation, the trial
court's finding of no racial consideration was clearly erroneous. 31 4
In contrast, the state's explanation survived a Batson challenge in Harris v.
State,315 a capital murder prosecution. The court of criminal appeals held
the following explanations sufficiently race neutral so as to support the trial
court's finding of no purposeful discrimination: 31 6 (1) the panel member's
brother was on felony probation; (2) the panel member would hold the state
to proof beyond any and all doubt in answering the punishment issues; and
(3) two panel members indicated they could never answer "yes" to the pun-
ishment issues. These reasons were racially neutral, logically related to the
case to be tried, and based directly on the juror's responses. 31 7
In contrast to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the reported decisions
of the intermediate appellate courts during the Survey period all found suffi-
ciently race neutral explanations to support the trial court's ruling. In Mc-
Henry v. State318 the state's explanation for the strike was that the juror had
been arrested for traffic tickets and his son had been arrested for drug related
activity. Diaz v. State3 19 involved a challenge based on juror dress and de-
meanor. Newsome v. State320 upheld as sufficiently race neutral strikes based
upon: (1) a venire member's inability to properly complete the juror infor-
mation card; 32 1 (2) a panel member from New York who the prosecutor
concluded would thus be hardened to crime; (3) a panel member who was a
teacher and thus could be considered to have a liberal bent.
Significantly, in Newsome, the defense was unable to secure the prosecu-
tor's notes, made in preparation for the Batson hearing, for purposes of cross
examination. The appellate court was not persuaded that the prosecutor's
acknowledgement during cross examination that his notes would constitute
his statement of specific reasons was sufficient to bring those notes under the
purview of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 614(0. Thus, unlike Whitsey v.
State,3 2 2 in which the defendant was able to challenge the prosecutor's expla-
nations based in part because the letter "B" had been placed next to the
name of each black panel member, the defense could not meet its burden of
proving the explanations pretextual.
Lastly, in Rodriguez v. State323 the court of appeals pointedly illustrated
313. Id. at 605.
314. Id.
315. 827 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 381 (1992).
316. Under the clearly erroneous standard for review of Batson challenges, an appellate
court should defer to the findings of the trial judge unless the reviewing court is left with a firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed. Williams v. State, 804 S.W.2d 95, 101 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 2875 (1991).
317. Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 955 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert denied, 113 S. Ct.
381 (1992).
318. 823 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), vacated, 829 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992).
319. 823 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no pet.).
320. 829 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no pet.).
321. Placing date of birth in the box labeled "place of birth,"
322. 796 S.W.2d 711, 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989).
323. 832 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
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the fact-based nature of a Batson challenge. The defendant objected to the
jury on Batson grounds claiming that he was Hispanic and the prosecutor
had struck the only two Hispanic panel members. However, the jury itself
was selected from the first nineteen veniremen. The two potential jurors at
issue were in positions 25 and 32. Thus, the complained of strikes had no
impact on the composition of the jury, and were not grounds for relief.324
E. OPENING STATEMENTS
Several decisions encompassed situations in which a tial court denied the
defense the right to make an opening statement. In Moore v. State325 the
prosecutor declined to make an opening statement, following which the de-
fense requested the right to make an opening statement before the state put
on its evidence, which request was denied. The defense later declined the
court's invitation to present an opening statement at the beginning of the
defense testimony. In Boston v. State326 the state waived it's opening state-
ment and the trial court denied the defense request to make an opening
statement.
In each situation, the state argued procedural default: (1) as the state
waived opening statement, the defense had no right to make an opening
prior to the state's evidence, under article 36.01(B); 327 (2) the defendant
failed to preserve error by not specifying the grounds for the request and by
not objecting to the trial courts denial of the request; (3) the defendant
waived error because the record did not show what the defendant might
have said if the trial court had granted the defense; or (4) the defendant
waived the error because the defendant did not make an opening statement
prior to the presentation of defense evidence.
Each opinion emphasized that the trial court had no discretion in the mat-
ter, that defense counsel had the absolute right to choose the point at which
the opening statement was to be made. In other words, a defendant had the
right to make an opening statement before the state presented it's evidence
even if the state waived it's right to an opening statement under the statute.
The courts dispensed with any need for the defense to make a formal bill of
exception to preserve error.
Finally, the courts emphasized that article 36.01(a)(5) 328 specifically per-
mitted the defendant in his opening statement to tell the jury the defenses
relied upon and the facts expected to be proved. Disallowance of the right to
make an opening statement essentially disrupted the jury's orderly evalua-
tion of evidence. The jury could not evaluate the state's evidence while con-
sidering the defense's position. Neither court could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction
324. Id. at 729.
325. 829 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, rev. granted, without pet.).
326. 833 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, pet. filed).
327. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.01(b) (Vernon 1989).
328. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.01 (Vernon 1989).
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under Rule 81(b)(2). 329
In Bomer v. State330 the prosecutor in his opening statement said that an
unknown citizen informant was "in fear of retaliation" and "going to remain
anonymous" and that "I believe the evidence will show that this person
wanted to remain anonymous. '331 The defendant objected that the matter
was "extraneous," which was overruled; however the court sustained defense
objections during trial when the prosecutor asked if the informant wanted to
be unknown. The court of appeals concluded that given the brevity of the
harmful statement about retaliation and the strength of the evidence against
the defendant, the improper statement was not so harmful that it could not
have been cured by an instruction. 332 The court did admonish the state from
making opening statements as to damaging facts the state knows it cannot
prove, 333 a matter of little consolation to this defendant.
F. JUROR QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES
The practice of permitting jurors to question witnesses by means of sub-
mitting written questions to the court was addressed by several courts of
appeals during the 1991 survey, but no court banned the practice. In Morri-
son v. State3 34 the court found that the questionable benefits of the practice
did not outweigh the far reaching hazards presented, and held that "the
practice of permitting jurors to become active participants in the solicitation
of evidence by questioning witnesses" was not permissible, and further, was
not subject to a harm analysis.335 The court recognized that there were vari-
ous procedural and theoretical implications which remained unanswered, 336
but emphasized that any change in the system may only come through the
rule making power of the court of criminal appeals or by the legislature.
G. MOTION TO REOPEN TESTIMONY
Article 36.02337 has been interpreted to mean that a trial court errs when
329. TEX. R. CRIM. App. P. 81(b)(2).
330. 827 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd.).
331. Id. at 67.
332. Id. at 68.
333. Id. at 67.
334. 845 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
335. Id. at 889.
336. Examples of the procedural and theoretical implications mentioned by the court were:
"what is the permissible scope of juror? Should be jurors be told of the reasons for exclusion of
a submitted question? Should a witness be recalled if a juror thinks of a question after that
witness has been dismissed? If a juror's questions indicates that the juror is becoming prema-
turely impartial should the judge declare a mistrial? Should jurors be allowed to question a
defendant who chooses to take the stand? Especially troublesome is the possibility the juror
partiality may arise as the result of a single question or may arise in one juror as the result of
another's questions, however impartial those questions may appear." Id. at 888.
337. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN, art. 36.02 (Vernon 1989). Under this provision, the
trial court abuses its discretion by refusing to reopen the evidence when the following condi-
tions are met: (1) the witness was present and ready to testify; (2) the request to reopen was
made before the charge was read to the jury and final arguments were made; (3) the court had
some indication of what the testimony would have been, and was satisfied that the testimony
was material and bore directly on the main issues; and (4) there was no showing that introduc-
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he refuses a request to reopen for the purpose of producing relevant and
admissible evidence, notwithstanding its weight or the issue upon which it is
offered, provided that the request is timely under the statute and does not
threaten to unduly impede the trial. But the decision to reopen is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court.338
In Sims v. State339 the defense requested permission to reopen to show
that a certain witness had just been indicted for possession of cocaine based
on his testimony in the case on trial. However, the defense never obtained a
ruling on the request and never demonstrated the materiality of the evidence
or even that it was admissible.
In Lucious v. State340 the defendant complained on appeal that he was
prohibited from testifying after making a request to reopen the testimony.
After the court noted the necessary conditions preceding to the applicability
of article 36.02341 the court held that no timely motion to reopen had been
presented. 342 In this case, as the trial court began reading the charge to the
jury, the defendant interrupted, complaining that his objections had been
overruled. The defendant was removed from the courtroom. The defendant,
while being escorted out, told the bailiff to tell his attorney of his desire to
testify. The defendant was returned to court after the charge was read and
before final arguments but continued to disrupt the proceedings. At one
point he stated in an outburst that he desired to take the stand. The defend-
ant was removed from the courtroom a second time.
The court of appeals assumed that the defendant's message was timely
related to the defendant's counsel, but noted that there was no timely motion
to reopen presented to the court and no showing of the substance and mate-
riality of the defendant's testimony. As a matter of fact, the trial court did
not learn of the nature of the defendant's testimony until the hearing in the
motion for new trial, a point in time when the only relief available was the
granting of a new trial. Defendant's counsel testified that appellant's
message was relayed in the form of an inquiry, not a demand or request; and
that defense counsel did not present a motion to reopen because throughout
the trial the defendant had expressed the desire not to testify in view of his
prior felony convictions and his belief that the prosecution could not prove
it's case.
H. COURT'S CHARGE
In Biggins v. State34 3 the court held that in order for the defendant to be
tion of the testimony would have impeded the trial or interfered with the orderly administra-
tion of justice. Gibson v. State, 789 S.W.2d 421, 423 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, pet.
ref'd.).
338. Cain v. State, 666 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
339. 833 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd.).
340. 828 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.).
341. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.02 (Vernon 1981).
342. Lucious v. State, 828 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no
pet.).
343. 824 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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convicted as a party, the law of parties must be incorporated within the ap-
plication paragraph authorizing the jury's verdict. 3 "4 The defendant was
convicted of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. Evidence at trial
showed that someone other than the defendant made the actual delivery.
The evidence further showed that the defendant acted only as a party. In
the abstract portion of the court's instruction to the jury, the law of parties
was defined. However, that law was not incorporated into the application
paragraph. Because of that defect, the evidence was insufficient to support
the only verdict of guilty which the jury was authorized to return under the
charge given. 345
A different spin to the question was presented in State v. Lee,3 46 a case in
which the defendant complained that the evidence was insufficient to sup-
port a voluntary manslaughter conviction. The court held that the defend-
ant was estopped from objecting to the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the voluntary manslaughter charge in that the defendant had specifically re-
quested the submission of this lesser included offense to murder.347 In John-
son v. State3 48 the court reversed the judgment of conviction for attempted
capital murder, holding that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a jury
instruction on the lesser included offenses of third degree aggravated assault
and first degree aggravated assault.3 49 In determining whether the jury
should have been instructed on a lesser included offense, the court relied on
the two step analysis enunciated in Royster v. State.350 The capital murder
conviction in Ross v. State35 1 was reversed for the trial court's refusal to
instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. 352 The court, in addition,
observed that the determination of whether a particular offense is a lesser
included offense of the offense charged is made without regard to the punish-
ment involved. One offense may be a lesser offense of another even if it
carried the same penalty. The court emphasized that the included offense
need not be "lower" in the sense that it provided a lesser punishment. The
word "lesser" does not refer to the punishment range but to the factor that
distinguishes the included offense from the offense charged, i.e., "less than
344. Id. at 180.
345. Id. This decision reaffirms the commitment of the court of criminal appeals to two
decisions: Jones v. State, 815 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) and Walker v. State, 823
S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1481 (1992). In each case the
court of criminal appeals held that in order for the jury to be authorized to convict the defend-
ant as a party, the law of parties must be incorporated within the application paragraph of the
jury charge. Biggins, 824 S.W.2d at 180. In declining to overturn Jones and Walker, the court
of criminal appeals noted that the "State has not presented any argument not previously con-
sidered by this Court." Id.
346. 818 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
347. Lee, 818 S.W.2d at 781. See also Richardson v. State, 832 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. App.-
Waco 1992, pet. ref'd.) (in attempted murder case, defendant acquiesced in submission of
lesser included offense of aggravated assault of which defendant was convicted).
348. 828 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, pet. ref'd).
349. Johnson, 828 S.W.2d at 515.
350. 622 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).




all facts, less serious injury or risk of harm, less culpable mental state, or an
attempt."
Several cases were reversed because of defective court instructions. In
Fisher v. State35 3 the court held that the instruction to find the driver guilty,
if evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the driver intention-
ally or knowingly operated the vehicle without the effective consent of the
owner, was not proper as it failed to require proof that the driver knew that
he did not have the effective consent of the owner. 35 4 In Hernandez v.
State3 55 the court held that the defendant did not have the burden of demon-
strating in a driving-while-intoxicated prosecution that he had a valid driv-
ers license before he was entitled to an instruction that the jury could
recommend that this drivers license not be suspended under article 42.12,
section 13(g).3 56 In Vasquez v. State357 the court found that the instruction
on the defensive necessity should have been given to the jury in a prosecu-
tion for possession of a firearm by a felon.358
I. JAIL CLOTHES AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
In Randle v. State359 the defendant timely objected to being tried before
the jury in jail attire. The trial court stated on record that the jail had no
clothes which would fit the defendant, nor did the court, and that normally
the defendant's family would bring civilian clothes for the occasion, but had
not.3 60 The trial court inquired of the jury panel whether the fact that the
defendant was dressed in jail clothing "would cause them to feel that he was
automatically guilty," and instructed the panel not to hold it against the
defendant. 36' The court of appeals rejected this contention, particularly be-
cause the defendant had requested a speedy trial and could have moved for a
continuance or a postponement, and did not, and because the trial court had
appropriately instructed the jury.3 6 2
The court of criminal appeals reversed the conviction, finding that com-
pelling a defendant to stand trial in jail clothes violated the defendant's right
to a fair trial and his right to be presumed innocent. 363 The court concluded
that in the face of the defendant's objection, "it is the duty of the trial court,
the accused's attorney, the state's attorney, and the peace officers in control
of the accused to offer the accused an opportunity to wear civilian
clothes."'3 64 The court concluded that the defendant's attorney fulfilled his
353. 829 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. refd.).
354. Id. at 404.
355. 842 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
356. Hernandez, 842 S.W.2d at 296; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 13(g)
(Vernon 1989).
357. 830 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
358. Vasquez, 830 S.W.2d at 951.
359. 826 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
360. Id. at 944.
361. Id.
362. Id.




obligation by objecting, in timely fashion, to his client's being placed before
the jury in jail clothes. 365 In contrast, both the trial court and the prosecu-
tor "breached their duty by proceeding to voir dire over objection. '366
In Green v. State367 the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual as-
sault of a child and then placed in custody. The next day, additional testi-
mony was developed before the jury. At some time prior to final arguments,
the deputies, believing the defendant was being returned to court for sen-
tencing, did not allow the defendant to dress in street clothes and paraded
him down a hallway past the room where the jury was situated. At this time
the defendant was wearing jail clothing, hand cuffs and shackles. The state
asked for sixteen to fifty years in prison and the jury returned a ten year
verdict.
At the motion for new trial hearing, one juror testified that she and other
jurors saw the defendant walk passed the room but that no juror mentioned
those facts during deliberations and that seeing the defendant dressed in jail
clothing and restraints did not affect their verdict. The appellate record was
silent on the incident. No objection was raised and no jury instruction re-
quested. On appeal, the defendant presented no statement or argument of
how he was harmed. The court noted that the court of criminal appeals has
held such incidents are not reversible error per se, nor automatically require
a mistrial and that in this case the defendant being seen outside the court-
room in shackles and jail clothing distinguished the case from those in which
a defendant was forced to appear in the courtroom before the jury in such
attire.368  As there was no showing of harm, no reversible error was
found. 369
J. JURY SEPARATION
The court in Hood v. State370 found reversible error when the trial court
permitted the jurors to separate after the charge had been read to the jury at
the first stage of the trial over the defendant's objections under article
35.23. 37 1 Mandatory language of article 35.23372 raises a presumption of
harm that the state must seek to rebut, during trial or in a hearing on the
motion for new trial. The state never attempted to rebut the presumption
during trial; no motion for new trial was filed. The court concluded that the
type of error presented in this case was not an error subject to harm analysis
under Rule 81 (b)(2) as the record did "not reveal any concrete data from
which an appellate court (could) meaningfully gauge or quantify the effect of
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. 829 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no pet.).
368. Green, 829 S.W.2d at 939.
369. Id.
370. 828 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no pet.).
371. Hood, 828 S.W.2d at 96. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.23 (Vernon 1989).
372. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.23 (Vernon 1989).
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the error. 373 The court limited it's holding to the facts of this case. 374
K. PUNISHMENT HEARING
In Issa v. State375 the court of criminal appeals held that after an adjudica-
tion of guilt has been made, the defendant is entitled to a punishment hear-
ing.3 7 6 The defendant was charged with felony theft, and, pursuant to a plea
bargain, placed on deferred adjudication probation for five years. Prior to
the expiration of that period the state filed a motion to revoke, and a con-
tested hearing was held. At the conclusion of the state's evidence at that
hearing on the motion to revoke, the defendant moved for a judgment deny-
ing revocation based on a claim of insufficient evidence. When the trial
judge denied that motion, the defendant responded, "Defendant rests." '377
When the state objected during the defendant's closing argument, the de-
fendant asked permission to reopen the case and present testimony from his
supervising probation officer, who had not previously been called to testify.
The trial judge denied this request. At the conclusion of final argument, the
trial judge revoked the defendant's probation, sentencing him to a prison
term. When defense counsel stated, "I thought the probated sentence was
for five years,"' 378 the prosecutor responded that the judge had the power to
give the maximum sentence upon revocation of deferred adjudication. The
trial judge recessed the hearing and immediately left the bench. In a motion
for new trial, filed within the statutory time limit after the revocation hear-
ing, the defendant objected to the immediate sentencing.
The court of criminal appeals interpreted article 42.12, section 3d(b), 379
which provides that following an "adjudication of guilt, all proceedings, in-
cluding assessment of punishment, pronouncement of sentence, granting of
probation, and defendant's appeal continue as if the adjudication of guilt had
not been deferred," as entitling the defendant to a punishment hearing fol-
lowing an adjudication of guilt.3 80 At such a punishment hearing, the trial
judge must permit a defendant the opportunity to present punishment evi-
dence. 38 1 Error in Issa was not waived because defense counsel objected at
the first opportunity.3 82
One of the most significant decisions rendered by the court of criminal
appeals during the Survey period was Grunsfeld v. State,383 wherein the trial
court allowed evidence of unadjudicated, extraneous offenses during the
punishment phase in the trial of a non capital offense. 384 The court held that
373. Hood, 828 S.W.2d at 96.
374. Id.
375. 826 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
376. Id. at 161.
377. Id. at 160.
378. Id.
379. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 3d(b) (Vernon 1981).
380. Issa, 826 S.W.2d at 161.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. 843 S.W.2d 521 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
384. Grunsfeld, 843 S.W.2d at 522.
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article 37.07(3)(a) 385 as amended, does not allow admission of unadjudicated
extraneous offense evidence in the punishment phase of a trial on a non capi-
tal offense. The court observed that even if deemed relevant to sentencing by
the trial court, this type of evidence is not admissible at punishment "unless
(1) it is permitted by the Rules of Evidence, and (2) if the evidence sought to
be admitted is evidence of an extraneous offense, it satisfies article 37.07
(3)(a)'s definition of prior criminal record. '38 6
In Ortiz v. State387 the court revisited the admissibility of victim impact
evidence during the punishment hearing, emphasizing that the evidence
must bear some relationship to the defendant's personal responsibility and
moral guilt.388 The court held that evidence as to the victim's trauma and
it's consequences in this aggravated sexual assault case was properly admit-
ted.389 In Garrett v. State3g the court was careful to distinguish however
that evidence of the after-effects of a crime, while admissible at the punish-
ment hearing, is generally not admissible at the guilt/innocence stage. 391
While improperly admitted in Garrett, the evidence was found to be harm-
less error.392
In Garrett v. State393 the cause was remanded for a new trial on the pun-
ishment phase only. The trial court failed to order a presentence investiga-
tion, a matter which could not be waived by the defendant's failure to object,
under article 42.12, section 9(i). 394 This provision requires such an investi-
gation if it appears to the court through it's own observation or on sugges-
tion of a party, that the defendant may have a mental impairment, as was the
case in Garrett.395
The case of Borders v. State396 is unique for the very reason that it is on
the books to begin with in this state. Borders presented the issue of whether
the defendant preserved error by his motion for new trial concerning his
right to present evidence on the issue of punishment prior to the trial court's
assessment of punishment. 397 The record showed that the trial court briefly
reviewed the evidence, found the defendant guilty and immediately imposed
punishment at twenty years. Only at this juncture did the trial court pause
and ask if there was any reason why sentence should not be pronounced.
Defense counsel responded in the negative, and the trial court sentenced de-
fendant to twenty years in prison and a fine for possession of cocaine. On
appeal, the court held that article 37.07398 required the trial court to afford
385. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 3(a) (Vernon 1989).
386. Grunsfeld, 843 S.W.2d at 522.
387. 825 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no pet.).
388. Ortiz, 825 S.W.2d at 541.
389. Id. at 542.
390. 815 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, pet. refd.).
391. Garrett, 815 S.W.2d at 337.
392. Id. at 338.
393. 818 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no pet.).
394. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 9(i) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
395. Garrett, 818 SW.2d at 228.
396. 846 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
397. Id. at 834.
398. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 (Vernon 1989).
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the defendant the opportunity to present evidence regarding punishment, af-
ter it had found the particular defendant guilty. 399 Defense counsel did not
waive the right to present punishment evidence by not objecting at trial.4°
The matter was preserved by raising an objection in a timely filed motion for
new trial. 401
Unique cases involving the propriety of an affirmative finding of a deadly
weapon were presented in English v. State4° 2 and Ex parte Petty.40 3 In Eng-
lish the jury answered a special issue in the affirmative, that the defendant
used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to-wit: his Chevrolet pickup during the
commission of the offense. The facts showed that the defendant's pickup
truck collided with a vehicle operated by the decedent at the intersection of
two roads in Longview. Both drivers were alcohol-intoxicated at the time of
the collision. The defendant registered a .33 and the victim a .20
blood/alcohol. The defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter
and felony D.W.I., and was convicted of D.W.I. upon the state's election.
The defendant complained about the submission of the "deadly weapon is-
sue" to the jury because of the lack of evidence that the defendant used a
deadly weapon in the commission of the offense. The defendant argued that
there was no evidence he ran a red light, was speeding or otherwise operated
his truck in a reckless or negligent manner. The state pointed to the blood
alcohol level and the twenty eight hundred pounds of pickup truck. The
court observed that the evidence in other similar cases4° 4 revealed some spe-
cial relationship between the instrument found to be a deadly weapon by
reason of the manner of its use, and the "associated felony offense" for which
the accused was tried. 40 5 In previous cases involving the use of a motor
vehicle, the facts were distinguishable because the vehicle was intentionally,
recklessly or negligently used as a weapon by the accused. 4° 6 The evidence
in the instant case did not demonstrate such use.4° 7 One reasonable hypoth-
esis still available, according to the court, was that the defendant had the
right of way (green light) at the intersection and that the intoxicated victim
drove his vehicle through a red light into the path of the defendant's truck
immediately before the collision occurred. 4° 8 The court concluded that this
reasonable hypothesis had not been excluded by the evidence and therefore
the jury's finding that the defendant exhibited or used a deadly weapon dur-
ing the commission of the felony D.W.I. was not a rational finding. 40 9
In Ex parte Petty the court held that the felon's possession of a deadly
399. Borders, 846 S.W.2d at 835-36.
400. Id. at 836.
401. Id.
402. 828 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, pet. refd).
403. 833 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
404. The primary authorities included Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989), and Morgan v. State, 775 S.W.2d 403 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.).
405. English, 828 S.W.2d at 38.
406. Id.
407. Id.




weapon ( a handgun) did not, in and of itself constitute "use" during the
commission of the felony offense of unlawfully possessing a deadly
weapon. 41 0 In order to "use" a deadly weapon for affirmative finding pur-
poses, the weapon must be utilized to achieve an intended result, namely, the
commission of a felony offense separate and apart from "mere" posses-
sion.4 1 In the instant case, the weapon was not used in furtherance of any
collateral felony.4 12 Thus the finding of a deadly weapon was ordered
stricken. 41 3 The court reached a similar result in Narron v. State,4' 4 wherein
the defendant was convicted of possession of a prohibited weapon, the
weapon being a short barreled firearm.
L. PROCEDURE IN CAPITAL CASES
In Ex parte Mathes4 15 the court of criminal appeals applied collateral
estoppel principles in a capital murder punishment phase context. 41 6 The
defendant was charged in separate indictments with the capital murders of
two individuals killed in the course of commission of the same robbery. In
his first trial the defendant was convicted of the capital murder of the first
victim; however, the jury answered "no" to the second special issue, and
hence the death penalty was not imposed. 41 7 The state then announced its
intent to try the defendant for the capital murder of the second victim, once
again seeking the death penalty. The defendant filed an application for writ
of habeas corpus, seeking to bar litigation of the second special issue:
"whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society. ' 41 8 The
court of criminal appeals held that the jury's negative answer to the issue of
future dangerousness made during the first trial was the functional
equivalent of an acquittal of the death penalty. 41 9 Thus collateral estoppel
prevents the state from seeking the death penalty for the murder of the sec-
ond victim. 420 The court reasoned that whether there is a probability that
the defendant would constitute a continuing threat to society "is an issue of
ultimate fact, the resolution of which in a bifurcated proceeding is determi-
native of the judgment and sentence of the trial court."' 42' The effect of the
jury's negative answer to the second capital punishment special issue is that
the prosecution failed in its burden of proof.4 2 2 Significantly, in the punish-
ment phase of capital murder prosecution, reviewing courts are not dealing
410. Petty, 833 S.W.2d at 146.
411. Id. at 145.
412. Id.
413. Id. at 146.
414. 835 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
415. 830 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
416. Id. at 598.
417. Mathes v. State, 765 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, pet. ref'd).
418. Id.






with general verdicts. Rather, the court is confronted with resolution of
"controlling issues." 423 During the first trial the defendant prevailed on an
essential ultimate fact determinative of the death penalty; thus, the state
could not force the defendant to " 'run the gauntlet' a second time in the
hope that a different jury might find that evidence stipulated to be the same
as in the first trial more convincing. '424
III. THE APPEAL
A. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30(b) provides the grounds upon
which a new trial should be granted. 425 Included among the nine listed rea-
sons are allegations of jury misconduct. 426 In Buentello v. State427 the court
of criminal appeals was called upon to address the interplay of Rule 30(b)
with Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b), 428 to determine if the jurors'
discussion of applicable parole law violated the defendant's right to a fair
and impartial trial, and whether the jurors could impeach their verdict by
testimony concerning their mental processes during deliberations. 429 Cen-
tral to the court's decision in Buentello was the need to determine if Rule
606(b) had changed Texas criminal practice concerning claims of jury mis-
conduct. 430 Rule 606 concerns the competency of jurors as witnesses. It
provides, in part, that a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of jury deliberation or give evidence about the
juror's thought process.431 Trial counsel in Buentello filed a motion for new
trial with supporting affidavits from two jurors alleging jury misconduct and
receipt of other evidence. At the motion for new trial hearing, two jurors
testified about discussions during penalty state deliberations concerning the
applicability of early release on parole to appellant. The court of criminal
appeals held that adoption of Texas Rule of Criminal Evidence 606(b) didn't
423. Id.
424. Id. at 599.
425. TEX. R. App. P. 30(b).
426. Id.; TEx. R. CRIM. EvID. 606(b).
427. 826 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
428. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 606(b).
429. Buentello, 826 S.W.2d at 611.
430. Id. Prior to the effective date of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence and Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure, motions for new trial were governed by article 40.03 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. Article 40.03 was repealed by Texas Rules of Appel-
late Procedure, effective September 1, 1986 (Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 685, § 4). Id. n.2.
431. TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 606(b). Rule 606(b) provides:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's
deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or
emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indict-
ment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a
juror may testify as to any matter relevant to the validity of the verdict or indict-
ment. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a




change the law with respect to testimony that would be permitted in order to
impeach a jury's verdict.4 32 In so doing, the court noted that "the test for
admission of juror testimony at a hearing on a motion for new trial is not
whether the conduct constitutes an 'overt act,' but whether the matter
sought to be elicited is deemed by the trial court to be relevant to the validity
of the verdict. '4 33 The court further held that its prior test, adopted in
Sneed v. State,434 "is still a viable means of determining whether a jury's
discussion of parole law constitutes reversible error. ' 435 Under Sneed, to
show reversible error based on a jury's discussion of a parole law, the de-
fendant must show the existence of five factors: (1) a misstatement of the
law; (2) asserted as a fact; (3) by one professing to know the law; (4) which is
relied upon by other jurors; (5) who for that reason changed their vote to a
harsher punishment.436
In State v. Scott437 the defendant was convicted of arson. The critical
issue was whether the fire was intentionally set or was the result of an electri-
cal mishap. In a motion for new trial, the defendant claimed jury miscon-
duct based upon statements made by one of the jurors, an electrician with
extensive experience who communicated to the jury during deliberations
many facts based on his own experience, including the fact that the fire could
not have started the way the defendant said it did. The trial court granted
the motion for new trial and the state appealed. The court held that the
juror's testimony constituted "other evidence" received by the jury which
was adverse or harmful to the defendant, justifying the affirmative relief
granted. 438 By footnote the court observed that the written order granting
the amended motion for new trial was not in the record, a fact of little mo-
ment in this case because the parties agreed that a written order had been
actually entered by the court as required by Texas Rule Appellate Procedure
31(e)(3). 439 In Rasbury v. State440 the court reviewed a complaint of jury
misconduct based upon a juror's misstatement of the law of self-defense and
its effect on another juror in a murder prosecution. The court held that
evidence which had been excluded by the trial court but nevertheless devel-
oped by the defense on a bill of exception during the motion for new trial
hearing to be admissible, and remanded the case for a full evidentiary hear-
ing on the motion for new trial with expedited instructions.44 1
432. Buentello, 826 S.W.2d at 614.
433. Id.
434. 670 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
435. Buentello, 826 S.W.2d at 614.
436. Sneed, 670 S.W.2d at 266.
437. 819 S.W.2d 169 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, pet. refd).
438. Id. at 172.
439. Id. at 170 n.1; TEX. R. App. P. 31(e)(3).
440. 832 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, pet. ref'd).
441. Id. at 402. The court's holding relied heavily upon Buentello v. State, 826 S.W.2d 610
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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B. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In Buntion v. Harmon44 2 the defendant filed a writ of mandamus seeking
to direct the trial judge in a capital murder case to vacate an order replacing
court appointed trial counsel with new counsel on appeal. Determining that
the petitioner was entitled to writ relief, the court found that "[t]here must
be some principled reason, apparent from the record, to justify a trial judge's
sua sponte replacement of appointed counsel." 44 3 A trial judge does not
have discretion, over objection by the defendant and trial counsel, to replace
counsel for the appeal when the only justification is the "trial judge's per-
sonal 'feelings' and 'preferences'. "444 Although an indigent defendant does
not have a right to counsel of his own choosing, once counsel has been ap-
pointed, the trial judge is obligated to respect the attorney-client relationship
created as a result of that appointment. 445
C. NOTICE OF APPEAL
The court of criminal appeals continued to address the issue of adequacy
of notice of appeal from a plea of guilty in Riley v. State.446 When her mo-
tion to suppress evidence was denied, the defendant pled guilty to two pos-
session of controlled substance charges. In accordance with the terms of a
plea bargain, the trial judge assessed a probated punishment and fine in each
case. The defendant filed a written notice of appeal stating only that she
wished to appeal and that she was indigent and desired appointed counsel.
Absent from the written notice of appeal were any Rule 40(b)(1) 447 state-
ments that either the trial court granted permission to appeal or that the
matters being appealed were raised by written motion and ruled on before
trial.448 The state did not complain of the sufficiency of the written notice of
appeal to invoke the court of appeal's jurisdiction to consider non-jurisdic-
tional defects until the intermediate appellate court reversed for lack of
probable cause.
As a preliminary matter, the court of criminal appeals found that the
state's complaint of a defect in a notice of appeal is timely made when raised
442. 827 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
443. Id. at 949.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. 825 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
447. TEX. R. App. P. 40(b)(l).
448. Rule 40(b)(l) provides, in pertinent part:
Notice of appeal shall be given in writing filed with the clerk of the trial court.
Such notice shall be sufficient if it shows the desire of the defendant to appeal
from the judgment or other appealable order; but if the judgment was rendered
upon his plea of guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to article 1.15, Code of
Criminal Procedure, and the punishment assessed does not exceed the punish-
ment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant and his
attorney, in order to prosecute an appeal from a non-jurisdictional defect or error
that occurred prior to entry of the plea the notice shall state that the trial court
granted permission to appeal or shall specify that those matters were raised by




for the first time in a Motion for Rehearing in the court of appeals. 449 How-
ever, simultaneously it found the notice sufficient when the entire appellate
record was considered.450 Included in that record was an order signed by
the trial judge and styled, "Order Limiting Defendant's Appeal." That or-
der contained recitations that the defendant had been assessed punishment
in accordance with a plea bargain, that the trial court allowed appeal pursu-
ant to article 44.0245 1 and that a motion to suppress challenging the legality
of the arrest and subsequent search was raised before trial. Despite the fact
that the notice of appeal did not incorporate the order, either physically or
by reference, the presence of that order in the appellate record was sufficient
to permit the court of appeals to determine that it could address non-juris-
dictional defects on appeal.
4 52
A more narrow approach was taken by the court of criminal appeals in
addressing the adequacy of the state's written notice of appeal in another
case. In State v. Muller4 53 the court held that the literal language of article
44.01454 "requires the elected 'prosecuting attorney' (and not his assistant)
to 'make' the state's notice of appeal. ' 455 This making of the notice of ap-
peal can be accomplished in either of two manners: (1) the elected prosecut-
ing attorney physically signs the notice, or (2) the elected prosecuting
attorney personally and expressly authorizes an assistant to file a specific
notice of appeal on his behalf.4 56 Although the court acknowledged that the
literal wording of the statute places a significant burden on the prosecuting
attorney, the court was bound by the plain meaning of the clear and unam-
biguous statue.45 7 Thus, in Muller, the notice of appeal in a driving while
intoxicated case filed by an assistant district attorney, following the trial
judge's suppression of intoxilyzer results, was defective.458 Moreover, this
defect was not one of appellate procedure, and hence an error which could
be corrected by filing an amended notice of appeal.4 59 Rather, it was a "fail-
ure to abide by the substantive statutory requirements" which resulted in the
failure of the appellate court's jurisdiction to be invoked.4 6 °
D. BOND PENDING APPEAL
In Ex parte Crouch46 1 the state brought forward the question of whether
article 44.04(b) 462 must be construed to require the denial of post trial bail
when a defendant has been convicted of one of the offenses listed under sec-
449. Riley, 825 S.W.2d at 700.
450. Id. at 701.
451. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01 (Vernon 1979).
452. Riley, 825 S.W.2d at 701.
453. 829 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
454. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01 (Vernon 1979).
455. Muller, 829 S.W.2d at 811-12.
456. Id. at 812.
457. Id. at 811.
458. Id. at 812.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. 838 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
462. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.04(b) (Vernon 1989).
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tion 481.107(b) through (e) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, 463 regard-
less of whether the defendant was a repeat felony offender as described in
that statute.46 The court sustained the state's contention, holding that the
plain language of the statute made it clear that the legislature intended to
deny bail to the convicted felon where punishment exceeded fifteen years
confinement or where defendant had been convicted of an offense so listed
without reference to the repeat offender definition.465
E. APPELLATE RECORD
In Greenwood v. State466 the court clarified the relationship between ap-
pellate rules permitting a partial statement of facts and challenges to suffi-
ciency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 53(d) allows a defendant to bring a limited appeal in a criminal
case.467 The defendant in Greenwood did so, then argued that there was
insufficient evidence to support his conviction for misdemeanor assault when
the presumptions of Rule 53(d) were applied. The court rejected that claim,
holding that Rule 53(d) presumptions do not apply to sufficiency chal-
lenges. 468 The presumptions do not apply because in a sufficiency challenge,
it is the responsibility of the appellate court to review the entire record in a
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine if any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a responsi-
ble doubt.469 This responsibility is constitutionally mandated.470 When
only a partial record is presented to the reviewing court, consideration of all
relevant evidence in a given case is impossible. 471 However, as shown in
Perez v. State,472 different considerations apply when the defendant is unable
to supply a complete statement of facts despite good faith and due dili-
gence. 473 In Perez the defendant was convicted of capital murder and sen-
tenced to death in 1983. At that time, article 40.09474 governed. Disposition
of the defendant's claim would now be controlled by Texas Rule of Appel-
463. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.107(b)-(e).
464. Crouch, 838 S.W.2d at 254.
465. Id.
466. 823 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
467. Rule 53(d) provides:
If appellant requests or prepares a partial statement of facts, he shall include in
his request or proposal a statement of the points to be relied on and shall there-
after be limited to such points. If such statement is filed, there shall be a pre-
sumption on appeal that nothing omitted from the record is relevant to any of
the points specified or to the disposition of the appeal. Any other party may
designate additional portions of the evidence to be included in the statement of
facts.
TEX. R. App. P. 53(d).
468. Greenwood, 823 S.W.2d at 661.
469. Id.
470. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
471. Greenwood, 823 S.W.2d at 661.
472. 824 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
473. Id. at 567.
474. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 40.09 (repealed 1986).
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late Procedure 50 (effective September 1, 1986). 4 7 5 Under either provision, a
similar result would be compelled. The attorney in Perez objected to the
record when he found missing portions and sections which he believed did
not accurately reflect what occurred at trial. At that point it was discovered
that the court reporter had lost the trial tapes and records of "everything,"
from the trial other than voir dire. The defendant and prosecutor could not
agree on how to correct the alleged errors or how to make substitutions for
the missing portions of the statement of facts. The court held that the
proper remedy would be the granting of a new trial.47 6 Significantly, by so
doing, the court rejected arguments that a harmless error analysis should be
applied to such error.47 7 Reasoning that the function of a harmless error
analysis is to protect against interference with the integrity of a trial, the
court concluded that failure to provide a complete appellate record does not
impact the internal integrity of a trial, "but instead interferes with the judi-
cial process by blocking an appellate court's ability to assess the record of a
trial.",4 78
In Vincent v. State47 9 a hearing was held on the defendant's financial situa-
tion and the trial court's denial of court-appointed counsel on appeal and a
free record. On appeal, the court held that the evidence justified a finding
that the defendant had intentionally disposed of all of his property subse-
quent to his conviction such as to bring about his own indigency and thus
justified the trial court's ruling.480 The court relied upon the factors listed in
article 26.04(b) 481 including the defendant's income, his source of income,
property owned, outstanding obligations, necessary expenses, the number
and ages of dependents, if any, spousal income, if any, and whether the de-
fendant has posted or has been capable of posting bail.
4 82
A similar result occurred in Tafarroji v. State483 wherein the trial court
ordered the defendant to pay a one thousand dollar deposit for the statement
of facts, finding him to be only partially indigent. The defendant, however,
made no pretense of exercising any degree of diligence. The defendant did
not file a pauper's oath until more than a year after filing notice of appeal.
Indigency, in the absence of diligence, will not sustain the defendant's claim
for a free statement of facts.484 In addition, the court noted that the evi-
dence adduced at the hearing did not support his claim of indigency. 485 The
fact that the defendant had other creditors did not create an indigency sta-
tus. 48 6 The court found the defendant did not make out a prima facie show-
475. TEX. R. App. P. 50.
476. Perez, 824 S.W.2d at 568.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. 817 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, no pet.).
480. Id. at 191.
481. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.04(b).
482. Vincent, 817 S.W.2d at 191.
483. 818 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.).





ing of indigency and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the claim of indigency. 487
F. THE STATE'S APPEAL
In addition to cases discussing the adequacy of the prosecution notice of
appeal, 488 the court of criminal appeals decided three cases during the Sur-
vey period which clarify the scope of prosecutorial appellate review. In State
ex rel. Sutton v. Bage489 the court strictly construed the provisions of article
44.01(d)490 and Rule 41(b)(1) 49 1 concerning the timeliness of the state's no-
tice of appeal. The issue which the state sought to appeal in Sutton was the
granting of a motion to quash an indictment for organized criminal activity.
Although the trial judge stated in open court that the motion was granted,
he did not physically sign the order at that time. The prosecution was una-
ware that the order had been signed until thirteen days after it had been filed
with the district clerk, 17 days after the date of signing.
Both the statutory provisions and appellate rules provide that the state's
notice of appeal must be given within fifteen days. However, the statute
expresses that time frame as fifteen days "after the date on which the order,
ruling, or sentence to be appealed is entered by the court,"492 whereas the
appellate rule speaks to the date "an appealable order is signed by the trial
judge. ' 493 The court reconciled any perceived conflict between the provi-
sions by concluding that the triggering mechanism is the physical act of sign-
ing or rendering an order by the trial judge. 494 Establishing a concrete,
definite starting point for appellate timetables, the court concluded, would
best serve the interest of all parties.495 Accordingly, the court found no con-
flict between the statute and appellate rule.496
Favorable for the prosecution was the court's decision in State v. Gar-
rett,497 holding that the trial judge's order forcing the state to elect a theory
of prosecution was an appealable order under the terms of article 44.01 .498
The defendant in Garrett was indicted for the felony offense of delivery of
cocaine in an indictment which alleged three theories of delivery: actual
transfer, constructive transfer, and offer to sell. Based on the defendant's
motion to quash, the trial judge set aside the indictment on the theory that it
failed to provide adequate notice of the type of delivery that the state would
attempt to prove.
Holding that the trial judge's action was in effect the dismissing of an
487. Id.
488. See discussion infra part III.C.
489. 822 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
490. TEX. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(d) (Vernon 1993).
491. TEX. R. App. P. 41(b)(1) (amended 1989).
492. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(d) (emphasis added).
493. TEX. R. App. P. 41(b)(1) (emphasis added).
494. Sutton, 822 S.W.2d at 57.
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. 824 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
498. Id. at 183.
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indictment, the court of criminal appeals concluded that it was an appealable
action under the direct language of the statute.499 Although the defendant's
motion might be characterized as merely an effort to compel the state to
elect its theory of prosecution, the appellate court must look to the effect of
the trial court's action. 5°° In Garrett the effect of the order granting the
defense's motion to quash was to terminate the state's prosecution of an in-
dictment returned by a grand jury. Such actions are directly controlled by
the literal language of the statute setting forth the circumstances under
which the state is entitled to appeal a pretrial order. 50'
Similarly favorable to the state was the court's decision in Price v. State,502
allowing the prosecution to seek discretionary review from an intermediate
court of appeals' decision abating for consideration of new trial issues and
alternatively ordering a new hearing on punishment.50 3 The Price court af-
firmed the aggravated robbery conviction on issues of guilt or innocence.
However, it also attempted to abate the appeal by ordering the trial court to
hold a hearing on the defendant's motion for new trial. Alternatively, the
lower court's decision stated that should a new trial hearing not be con-
ducted within that thirty-day time frame, the judgment would be reversed
and the cause remanded for a new punishment hearing. The prosecution
sought discretionary review on an issue it claimed was dispositive: that the
lower appellate court failed to address the issue raised by the state of
whether the original motion for new trial had been timely presented in the
trial court. Central to the state's claim was its argument that the timeliness
of the motion was dispositive of the case, and therefore had to be addressed
by the court of appeals. The court of criminal appeals agreed. 5o4 Price rep-
resents a departure from two prior decisions of the court of criminal appeals
holding that it would not enter a state's petition for discretionary review filed
after an order of abatement. 50 5 Owing to the alternative nature of relief in
the court of appeals' written decision, the case is distinguishable from classic
interlocutory orders such as abatements for findings of fact and conclusions
of law.50 6
In State v. Kaiser507 the state attempted to appeal from a pretrial prelimi-
nary ruling on the use of "child outcry" testimony under article 38.072.508
499. Id. at 184. Article 44.01(a) provides that the state may appeal an order of the trial
court in a criminal action if that order "dismisses an indictment, information or complaint or
any portion of an indictment, information or complaint."
500. Id. at 183.
501. Id. at 183-84.
502. 826 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
503. Id. at 948.
504. Id.
505. Williams v. State, 780 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Measeles v. State, 661
S.W.2d 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). Central to the decision in each case was the court's
characterization of the order of abatement as an interlocutory order. The rationale in these
decisions was that such interlocutory orders did not decide a case and hence were not final
decisions from which discretionary review could lie.
506. Price, 826 S.W.2d at 948.
507. 822 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, pet. refd).
508. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.072 (Vernon 1989).
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The court held that the appeal was not an appeal from an order granting a
"motion to suppress evidence, a confession, or an admission" pursuant to
article 44.01(a)(5) 50 9 and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.5 10
The state argued that the Texas statute should be construed to allow the
state to appeal any pretrial evidentiary ruling of the trial court. The court
distinguished between the suppression of evidence because of constitutional
principle such as the Fourth Amendment and evidence excluded because it
is in some manner suspect or untrustworthy.5 11 The court held that by us-
ing the term "suppress" alone, and not in conjunction with the broader term
"exclude," the legislature meant to limit the state's appeal to those instances
in which evidence was suppressed, in the technical sense, not merely ex-
cluded. 51 2 Finally the court noted that the trial judge did not even state that
the evidence would be inadmissible at trial.51 3 Instead, he stated that if the
state attempted to introduce the testimony without complying with the no-
tice requirements, he would sustain an objection based on hearsay.5 1 4
In State v. Cuellar" 5 the court held that the state had no right to appeal
an order granting a motion to quash a revocation of probation.5 16 The state
did, however, have the right to appeal the court's order terminating proba-
tion and discharging the defendant, but in this case, the court found an ade-
quate legal basis for the court's discharge order and therefore affirmed it.5 17
In State v. Evans518 the court held that the state had the right to appeal a
trial court order allowing a defendant to withdraw his plea of no contest, on
the basis that the trial court's order granting the motion to withdraw had the
precise effect of granting a new trial, thus returning the case to the posture it
had been in before the plea was accepted.5 1 9 The court also held that the
trial court had the discretion to permit a defendant to withdraw a plea of no
contest after the sentence had been pronounced, on the basis that Rule 30
(b) 520 was illustrative, not exhaustive, as to the grounds for a new trial.521
G. AVAILABILITY OF APPEAL
The court of criminal appeals revisited the scope of the right to appeal
deferred adjudication proceedings 522 in Olowosuko v. State.523 It reaffirmed
that in deferred adjudication proceedings, no appeal may be taken from a
509. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
510. Kaiser, 822 S.W.2d at 698-99.
511. Id. at 700.
512. Id.
513. Id. at 701.
514. Id. at 701-02.
515. 815 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no pet.).
516. Id. at 297.
517. Id. at 298.
518. 843 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
519. Id. at 578.
520. TEX. R. App. P. 30(b).
521. Evans, 843 S.W.2d at 578.
522. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 § 5 (Vernon 1993).
523. 826 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
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determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt.524 Such an appeal is
expressly barred by the statutory language of article 42.12, section 5(b). 525
However, recent statutory changes 526 do permit an immediate appeal for
rulings on pre-trial motions in a deferred adjudication context, in compli-
ance with article 44.02.527 Thus the central issue to be resolved in any ap-
peal in a deferred adjudication context is identification of "the precise matter
a defendant seeks to appeal."' 528 If the defendant is challenging the trial
court's decision to proceed with an adjudication of guilt, there is an absolute
statutory bar to consideration of the issue on appeal.
529
Following a hearing on the state's motion, the trial judge found the de-
fendant guilty and imposed a six-month jail time sentence. The defendant's
serious constitutional challenge that his right to counsel was violated could
not be raised on a direct appeal from the decision to adjudicate his guilt.5 30
Similarly, if the defendant complains on appeal that the various conditions
of probation were impermissibly vague or indefinite and hence unenforce-
able, appellate review is precluded. 531 In contrast, a defendant may appeal
rulings on pre-trial motions in compliance with article 44.02.532
H. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a defense has been raised at trial, what role should a reviewing
court play in gauging the sufficiency of evidence? That was the issue re-
solved by the court of criminal appeals in Adelman v. State.533 The defend-
ant was prosecuted for the false imprisonment of her adult mentally ill son.
Representing herself during a trial to the court, the defendant relied on the
defense of justification. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, find-
ing the evidence insufficient based on its review of evidence supporting the
justification defense. 534 The court of criminal appeals rejected that review
and held that the proper analysis on appeal is "whether, after viewing all the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact would have found the essential elements of [the offense] beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and also would have found against appellant on the [defen-
sive] issue beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 535 It is not the role of the appellate
524. Id. at 942.
525. Id.
526. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(j) (Vernon 1993).
527. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.02 (Vernon 1979).
528. Olowosuko, 826 S.W. 2d at 941.
529. Id. at 942. Accord Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d I (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). In Phynes
v. State, application of the statutory bar is troublesome because the adjudication hearing was
conducted when the defendant's lawyer was not present. The defendant had entered a plea of
guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana and been placed on deferred adjudication for
six months. Before the end of that probationary term, the state moved to adjudicate guilt.
530. Phynes, 828 S.W.2d at 2.
531. Olowosuko, 826 S.W.2d at 942 n.1.
532. See supra text accompanying 527.
533. 828 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
534. Adelman v. State, 731 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987), rev'd, 828
S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).




court to decide if the defendant's actions were justified.536 Rather, that de-
termination is one properly made by the finder of fact.537 By finding the
defendant guilty, the trier of fact implicitly rejected her defense. 538 Upon
conviction, the duty of the appellate court is to determine if the explicit and
implicit findings by the trier of fact are rational under legal standards, and
thus support the conviction. 539 Cautioning that the reviewing court should
not substitute its opinion of witness credibility or the weight to be given
testimony for that of the trier of fact, the court of criminal appeals reviewed
the trial evidence and concluded: "Although some hypothetical, rational
trier of fact could have accepted appellant's defense in this case, another trier
of fact could have rejected that defense beyond a reasonable doubt and such
finding would be legally sufficient to support the conviction. Therefore, the
court of appeals should have upheld the conviction. '"540
I. NATURE OF COURT OF APPEALS REVIEW
In related decisions, the court of criminal appeals considered challenges to
the nature and depth of intermediate appellate court review. The consistent
holding in each case was that appellate courts have a duty to address all
issues raised by a party before the courts can deny that party relief.541 In
Weatherford v. State542 the court of appeals had sustained the defendant's
search and seizure challenges without addressing the state's dual contentions
that the challenge had not been preserved, and that any error was harm-
less.543 The court of criminal appeals remanded to the intermediate appel-
late court for consideration of those grounds. 544
A similar result occurred for the defendant when the court of appeals af-
firmed an aggravated sexual assault conviction without addressing the de-
fendant's alternative claim on appeal that the victim's written statement to
the police was improperly admitted because it constituted bolstering.545 In
Wood v. State546 the court of criminal appeals remanded to the intermediate
appellate court stressing that Rule 90(a) 54 7 requires that the written opinion
of the reviewing court address every issue raised and necessary to final dispo-
sition of the case. 548
536. Id.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 422.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 423.
541. See Weatherford v. State, 828 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); Wood v. State,
828 S.W.2d 13, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
542. 828 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
543. Weatherford v. State, 822 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991), vacated, 828
S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
544. Weatherford, 828 S.W.2d at 13.
545. Wood v. State, 822 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1991), vacated, 828
S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The court of appeals did address and reject the defend-
ant's challenge to admissibility of the statement based on hearsay grounds. Id. at 216.
546. 828 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
547. TEX. R. APP. P. 90(a).
548. Wood, 828 S.W.2d at 14.
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J. REMAND AND RETRIAL CONSIDERATIONS
The court of criminal appeals addressed the scope of review upon remand
in Williams v. State.549 The court of criminal appeals had earlier remanded
the defendant's capital murder appeal to the court of appeals to determine
whether an out of court statement made by an accomplice was made in fur-
therance of an ongoing conspiracy. 550 On remand, the court of appeals held
the statements were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy and thus were
admissible pursuant to Rule 801 (e)(2)(E). 55' However the court of appeals
went further and also held that the statements were admissible under the
exception of the hearsay rule which allows admission of statements against
interest;552 that argument had not been made by either the defense or prose-
cution during the course of the appeal. The court of criminal appeals con-
cluded that this second finding improperly exceeded the scope of its remand
order.553 Once again, the case was remanded. 554 The conclusion from Wil-
liams total appellate history: upon remand, the reviewing court is strictly
limited to consideration of the specific issues on which remand was
granted. 555
In a related area, in Janecka v. State556 the court narrowly construed
when a party may raise a new claim for alleged error occurring on re-
mand. 557 The defendant's capital murder appeal was originally abated and
remanded to the trial court to allow the defendant to make a showing of
harm based on the ruling of his motion to quash the indictment.558 The
remand was necessary because the test for harmless error had been estab-
lished by the court after the time that the defendant's case was tried.559 On
remand, the trial court appointed a special master to preside over the hear-
ing. The state did not object to that appointment at the time it was made,
but rather, chose to fully participate in the proceeding before the master.
Following that hearing, the trial judge adopted the findings of fact and con-
clusions of law made by the special master. The court of criminal appeals
reversed the capital murder conviction based on the defendant's demonstra-
tion of harm. 560 It was on rehearing from that decision that the state first
alleged the trial judge lacked authority to appoint a special master. The
state's theory was that, unlike a post conviction writ of habeas corpus scena-
rio,561 no statute gives authority to Texas judges to appoint a special master
549. 829 S.W.2d 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
550. Williams v. State, 790 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
551. Williams v. State, 815 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991), rev'd, 829 S.W.2d
216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 801(e)(2)(E).
552. Williams, 815 S.W.2d at 747-48; TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 803(24).
553. Williams, 829 S.W.2d at 217-18.
554. Id. at 218.
555. Id. at 217-18.
556. 823 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
557. Id. at 243.
558. Janecka v. State, 739 S.W.2d 813, 842 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
559. Id. The test for harmless error had been set forth in Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900
(Tex. Crim. App. 1986).
560. Janeka, 823 S.W.2d at 238.
561. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07 (Vernon 1977).
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to conduct hearings in a case on direct appeal. Thus, the state contended,
the entire proceeding was void from its inception. The court of criminal
appeals never reached that issue. Instead, it noted that "[h]ad the state ob-
jected at the time the master was appointed, or perhaps on submission before
this Court, we might have reached the merits of its claim."' 562 However,
raising a claim for the first time on rehearing from a decision following re-
mand was not timely.563
On retrial following reversal for error occurring at the punishment phase,
a defendant is entitled to make a new jury election. 564 In Saldana v. State565
the court of criminal appeals held that a defendant is not bound by his
waiver of a jury at the original trial when the cause has been remanded for
another punishment hearing pursuant to article 44.29(b). 566 In reaching
that decision, the court noted that the legislature did not specifically restrict
the terms of article 44.29(b) to fact patterns in which punishment was as-
sessed by a jury in the original trial. The court concluded that a "fair read-
ing" of the statutory language is that the defendant has the right to elect jury
assessment of punishment following remand. 567 Moreover, that statutory
interpretation is not disputed by the legislative history of article 44.29(b).
562. Janecka, 823 S.W.2d at 243.
563. Id. at 244.
564. See Saldana v. State, 826 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
565. 826 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
566. Id. at 951; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.29(b) (Vernon 1993).
567. Saldana, 826 S.W.2d at 951.
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